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Hardware and software limitations found in legacy communications equipment 
organically assigned to the edge users are unable to meet the ever increasing information 
exchange requirements. The computational and throughput capability in current fielded 
communication systems are unable to keep pace with the ever increasing bandwidth 
intensive information exchange requirements. Expeditionary units at the tactical edge are 
forced to rely on external personnel and equipment to overcome the existing capabilities 
gap in order to remain agile, highly responsive, and achieve shared operational picture.  
The purpose of this study was to analyze the requirements and feasibility of 
adapting a local cloudlet model for enabling mobile application deployment and data 
dissemination capability to Marine units in an expeditionary environment. An empirical 
analysis comparing current systems requirements to the cloud model system requirements 
was performed. Additionally, an evaluation was conducted on the impact of mature 
technologies from academia, government, and commercial research onto availability of 
local cloudlet at the tactical edge. The significance of the aforementioned analysis and 
evaluation determined the local cloudlet model provided an operationally viable 
alternative to the current method of information sharing in edge organizations. This study 
should prompt the Marine Corps to invest in further research. 
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While deployed to Afghanistan, the researchers experienced firsthand the 
challenges associated with planning, installing, operating, and maintaining an enterprise 
tactical network. As Communications Officers, the researchers were responsible to the 
commander for ensuring a flexible, interoperable, secure, reliable, survivable, and timely 
network capable of supporting the critical command and control (C2) assets needed for 
effective decision-making. The challenge posed to the researchers was to satisfy 
commanders at all levels’ information requirements in a resource-constrained 
environment. At the higher headquarters (HHQ), commanders and their staffs were 
outfitted with multiple high throughput satellite communication terminals and their 
command post became the communication integration hub for all subordinate units. The 
robust network infrastructure located there provided a digital communication backbone 
that was capable of supporting all Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) (voice, 
video, and data [V2D]) capabilities.  
When visiting HHQ, the researchers noticed a command operation center (COC) 
that was effectively processing the information critical to maintaining combat operation 
superiority (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010a, p. 1-1). At this location, bandwidth limitations, 
throughput capacity, and resource constriction were not a factor. How was it that a 
location farthest removed from the tactical edge was equipped with primary, secondary, 
and tertiary communication assets? The imbalance of resources in favor of the HHQ 
contradicted some of the tenets echoed in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
(MCWP) 3–40.3. 
The MCS must be able to satisfy the C2 requirements of the expeditionary 
battlefield. It must provide Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
commanders and their staffs with the tools necessary to collect, process, 
analyze, and exchange information rapidly in support of operations 
planning and execution. These systems must make the necessary 
information available when and where it is needed on the battlefield. 
Employment of these systems must not adversely affect the MAGTF’s 
freedom of action (FOA) and mobility, and they must be reliable, flexible, 
responsive, and configurable to mission needs. The success of the 
MAGTF on the modern battlefield depends on designing, planning, and 
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employing a communications system that satisfies the information needs 
of the MAGTF process. (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010a, p. 1-2) 
The researchers’ dilemma centered on maximizing capability without sacrificing 
flexibility. This calls to attention a perceived technology gap between the information 
required to support the decision makers and the capabilities/limitations of the equipment 
provided to the lower echelons of command. Unlike the researchers’ command post (CP), 
which actively relocated throughout the dynamic and fluid area of responsibility (AOR), 
these fortified communication hubs were positioned on permanent bases that had 
received commercial upgrades. These enhancements provided HHQ commanders and 
their staffs with the same C2 capabilities they had trained on during command post 
exercises prior to deployment.  
“Train like you fight” is an adage commonly used throughout the Marine Corps. 
At its basic level, it describes the need to simulate combat as realistically as possible and 
to maximize the battlefield advantages gained from leveraging technically superior 
equipment. The Marine Corps in conjunction with private and government institutions 
has developed and adopted various systems and applications (COBRA3, AFATDS, 
M2C2) to assist commanders in improving the decision-making and information 
dissemination cycle. Dillingham and Nathans (2007) stated that a critical factor in 
accomplishing net-centric warfare and operations is to provide the warfighter at the 
tactical edge with vital information at critical points in battle through access to the Global 
Information Grid (GIG). 
In garrison, commanders have the benefit of an established commercial network 
architecture that connects the otherwise bandwidth/throughput intensive applications and 
systems they use to model crises and contingencies. Battle simulation centers place 
commanders in ideal environmental conditions, and are equipped with the latest and 
greatest of innovations designed for the Marine Corps. Commanders are able to 
participate in exercises using hardwired equipment that connects the higher echelon 
(major subordinate command) to the lower echelon (platoon). This construct enables all 
participants to effectively war game scenarios and resolve any procedural issues without 
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having to deploy to the field. As realistic as it is supposed to be, it does not account for 
network latency or the unavailability of an asset—in other words; it is a perfect scenario.  
In combat, commanders are exposed to the harsh reality of the lack of, or 
limitations of their organic “command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment” (National Academics Press, 2006, 
p. 1). Without being directly connected to their subordinates via Ethernet, commanders 
are now forced to rely on communicating using tactical assets. HHQ commanders insist 
on receiving what has been deemed critical information to accurately assess the 
developing situation and issue orders, in spite of the subordinate commander at the 
tactical edge not having the assets required to process the request for information. This 
capability gap has resulted in the need to provide small unit leaders with an improved 
range of capabilities in the following areas: blue and red force position reporting; receive 
real-time video from all available platforms; close air support request; and increased 
situation awareness through collaboration and C2 (Young & Ishii, 2012, pp. 1–4).  
The Cebrowski Institute recognized this shortfall and concluded the research  
in this area is driven by a deficiency in communication dissemination capabilities 
observed by tactical units, while participating in humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief (HADR) efforts, or during full-scale kinetic operations (Military Wireless 
Communication, n.d.). The researchers observed the challenges mobile forces faced when 
issued a mission, outfitted with specific C2 equipment, and tasked to perform distributed 
operations in an austere environment (Military Wireless Communication, n.d.). The 
program of record (PoR) equipment assigned, in accordance with a unit’s table of 
organization and equipment (TO/E) allowance, challenged the ability for the subordinate 
units to conduct maneuver warfare throughout their assigned AOR; while simultaneously 
maintaining uninterrupted communications links with their HHQ COC. The current 
Department of Defense (DOD) communications equipment used in support of combat 
operations require fixed or stationary transmission systems. The ability to rapidly gather, 
process, and disseminate information to decision-makers while maintaining FOA and 
freedom of movement (FOM) is essential at the tactical edge.  
 4
This research is to study the feasibility of developing this capability and the 
overall added value to the United States Marine Corps by procuring such a capability. 
The researchers propose that maintaining a highly mobile, rapidly deployable, tactical 
force capable of conducting decentralized distributed operations at the tactical edge  
does not have to come at the sacrifice of mission-essential V2D capabilities. Adapting  
a Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) model to meet the needs of an expeditionary force  
may allow the USMC to reduce the time in the data-to-decision (D2D) cycle at the 
tactical edge.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2011, the National Military Strategy directed the improvement in the ability to 
rapidly respond to crisis with little to no warning; deploy and employ flexible C2 assets, 
and become a more scalable force (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). Admiral 
Mullen envisioned a Joint Force with the capability to collect information, conduct 
analysis, and distribute intelligence products (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2011). Since inception, the Marine Corps has been that expeditionary force capable of 
conducting multifaceted operations. Former Commandant General Krulak (1999) referred 
to this as the “three block war.” Essentially, Marines must be trained to prosecute full-
spectrum warfare (humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping operations, and full-scale 
military action) within a radius of three contiguous city block. Over the past decade, the 
Marine Corps has participated in a protracted multi-theater counterinsurgency (COIN) 
campaign. The United States’ national interest abroad required the USMC to become an 
occupying force operating out of tactical forward operating bases (FOB) with 
commercialized communication infrastructure supporting the HHQ.  
At the company down to the squad level, the organic communication assets were 
incompatible with the demand levied upon the commander to provide situational updates 
in real-time. Tactical forces are inundated with request for information that required the 
usage of multiple “single-frequency-spectrum-capable” devices in order to satisfy the 
insatiable appetite of their HHQ (Oregon, 2011, p. 3). This resulted in universal needs 
statement (UNS) from combatant commanders detailing a requirement for C4ISR 
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procurement. The influx of new equipment provided the capability but also increased the 
logistical burden and further limited mobility since tactical forces were reinforced with 
multiple devices to perform the six war-fighting functions outlined in Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1–0, Marine Corps Operations: C2, Intelligence, 
Maneuver, Fires, Logistics, and Force Protection (U.S. Marine Corps, 2011a, p. B-1). 
If a single mobile government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) communication device were 
configured to provide warfighting functionality (V2D, fires support, medical evacuation, 
instant messaging, friendly force location, and enemy force location) through hosting 
secure military designed applications, then this capability would provide forces operating 
at the tactical edge increased flexibility in response to global conflicts. Former 
Commandant General Conway (2008, p. 3) stated “though our Corps has recently proven 
itself in ‘sustained operations ashore,’ future operational environments will place a 
premium on agile expeditionary forces, able to act with unprecedented speed and 
versatility in austere conditions against a wide range of adversaries.”  
The draw down in Afghanistan marks an end of a land-based theater support era 
for the USMC and provides an opportunity for a refocus on its fundamental roots as a 
sea-based, organically supported expeditionary organization. The shift in operational 
outlook requires research for a system that enables first in forces with the critical 
operational capabilities needed in support of the next generation (NextGen) of tactical 
warfighter. The current Marine Corps’ units, at the tactical edge, are unable to access 
decision making applications in a contested environment. The contested environment is 
about supporting reliable/resilient distributed C2 when the upper level is no longer 
available and lower levels absorb the workload. The focus of this research is on the 
denied, disconnected, intermittent, and limited (D-DIL) environment, which is a subset of 
a contested environment with an emphasis on network constraints. End users at the 
forward edge of the battlefield are operating in a dynamic environment. The requirement 
to remain agile, highly responsive, and flexible to change does not coincide with the time 
intensive requirement to setup bulky stationary satellite communications equipment. 
Even when the tactical commander is able to operate out of a fortified position, their 
communication equipment still does not have the same throughput capabilities allocated 
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as their higher headquarters resulting in latency or the inability to access automated 
applications such as Fires Request and Personnel Status Reports. The Marine Corps’  
CIO is interested in leveraging commercial-off-the-shelf/government-off-the-shelf 
(COTS/GOTS) open source data computing and delivery systems in order to provide 
warfighters, at every level, with a common operational picture throughout all phases of 
conflict. This research will focus on shared operational picture (SOP) by conducting an 
analysis of the benefits of adapting a local cloudlet model to host warfighting 
applications accessible by tactical edge units using mobile devices in D-DIL 
environments to improve collaboration, situation awareness, and decision making. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the requirements and feasibility of 
adapting a local cloudlet model for enabling application deployment and data 
dissemination capability to Marine units in an expeditionary environment through a 
mobile device. Young et al. (2012, pp. 1–4) stated that at the tactical edge there is a 
requirement for intelligence and operations fusion capability in order to improve 
battlefield situation awareness (BFSA), friendly force preservation, fires accuracy, 
lethality, and tactical advantage. The significance of this is to determine if the 
aforementioned model provides an operationally viable alternative to the current method 
of information sharing in edge organizations. Specifically, the researchers will evaluate 
the impact of mature technologies from academia, commercial and government research 
onto availability of a local cloudlet at the tactical edge.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will be guided by the following questions: 
 Is the tactical cloudlet a viable solution for extending enterprise end-to-
end architecture to the edge users?  
 Can a local cloudlet at the tactical edge be deployed to be readily 
accessible by the mobile device?  
 What future capability requirements, hardware/software technology 
innovations are necessary to operate a mobile device in a D-DIL 
environment? 
 7
 What is the impact of leveraging mature technologies to enhance the 
decision support system (DSS) using local cloudlets at the tactical edge? 
D. OBJECTIVES 
The research will comprise several objectives: 
 Analyze current and future requirements for a cloud computing solution at 
the tactical edge 
 Compare current communication solution to the cloud model 
 Provide analysis requirements for equipment and training 
 Offer prototype solutions for a mobile device strategy 
 Describe means to improve SOP, situation awareness, and decision-
making on a mobile device in a D-DIL environment 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research will compare current systems requirements to the cloud model 
system requirements. The literature review will establish a baseline for comparison using 
current capabilities and C2 requirements of the Marine Corps Infantry Company. The 
literature review will examine existing technological capability gaps and the commercial 
solution designed to fulfill the requirement. The literature review will end with 
examining the feasibility of adapting mobile device infrastructure into a future tactical 
cloud ecosystem.  
F. SCOPE 
The scope of this research is focused on the benefits gained by the USMC when 
adapting a cloud model to host C2 developed applications available to the warfighter via 
mobile device technology in order to improve the D2D capability of units at the tactical 
edge. This thesis will neither provide a standard operating procedure detailing the 
deployment of a cloud model and the hosted applications accessible by mobile devices, 
nor attempt to define security parameters or policies needed to be in compliance with 
DOD directives, policies, or standards. Operational security (OpSec) risk to C2 and 
acceptable usage policies within the DOD are potential limitations to this research. The 
research, as basis for comparison against existing tactical communications, will look at 
existing implementations as opposed to emerging conceptual ideas. The comparison will 
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be limited to current legacy systems and a current alternative solution. The USMC 
Infantry Company and associated TO/E will serve as the base unit for the research. 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
USMC requirements analysis of existing equipment deficiencies will be 
conducted using an empirical method. The analysis will present the benefits of a cloud 
model designed to incorporate mobile device architecture. The first chapter provides an 
overview and general observations of a deployed environment, which led to the questions 
that guided and focused the research. The second chapter is a literature review that 
establishes the USMC information technology (IT) framework for the tactical edge 
including a mobile device strategy using PaaS. This chapter will present the current 
information dissemination trends and the movement toward commercial mobile device 
technology. The second chapter will also introduce existing DOD and USMC policy and 
guidance toward mobile device technology acquisition. In-depth investigation of trends, 
policy, and guidance will aid in determining the current and future tactical level C2 
capability requirements. Tactical level units’ capability degradation, when systems are 
deployed in the following conditions: fixed—on-the-move (OTM)—dismounted, require 
an analysis of a future alternative. The third chapter will examine a hybrid cloud 
architecture, which includes operational cloudlet nodes linked to tactical cloudlet nodes. 
Within the tactical level cloudlet sub-architecture are user nodes operating in a D-DIL 
environment that requires connectivity to enterprise nodes in the presence of anti-
access/area denial (A2AD) threats through mobile devices. In addition, this chapter will 
compare this architecture to current equipment at the tactical level. The fourth chapter 
will outline suggested mobile device prototype requirements and design. The fifth chapter 
will analyze Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) and the decision support system for mobile 
devices operating in the D-DIL environment in order to accelerate the decision-making 
ability. The sixth chapter provides conclusions and recommendations for future work.  
 9
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The primary assignment of the Marine Corps Infantry Rifle Company is to “defeat 
the enemy by fire, maneuver, and close combat and to conduct other operations as 
directed across the range of military operations [ROMO]” (U.S. Marine Corps, 2014a, 
p. 1-3). Specifically, the infantry rifle company is tasked to “plan, coordinate, and 
conduct ground combat operations and type operations, as directed, across the spectrum 
of war in an expeditionary environment” (U.S. Marine Corps, 2014c, pp. 2–3). It 
achieves this by effectively employing personnel and equipment in order to maximize 
organic firepower as depicted in Figure 1 (U.S. Marine Corps, 1998, p. 4-7). 
 
 USMC Infantry Rifle Company  Figure 1. 
(from U.S. Marine Corps, 1998, p. 4-7) 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT 
The personnel and equipment assigned to an infantry rifle company are in 
accordance with (IAW) a unit’s TO/E, respectively. An infantry rifle company has six 
officers and 176 enlisted Marines (see Appendix A). It is outfitted with 176 PRC-153 
integrated intra-squad radios (IISR) that act as wireless intercom system. The current T/E 
in Appendix B lists the 13 satellite communication capable radio systems: AN/VRC-110 
quantity 2; AN/VRC-114 quantity 1; AN/PRC-117G(V)2 quantity 4; and AN/PRC-
117F(V)1C quantity 6 (U.S. Marine Corps, 2014c, pp. 18-20).  
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B. EXPANDING INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS, 
STRATEGY, AND CAPABILITY GAPS 
At the onset of both OEF and OPERATION Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces required 
the ability to communicate across all command levels in support of land, sea, and air 
operations. Beyond line of sight (BLOS) satellite communication (SATCOM)-capable 
portable terminals were essential for remote mobile unit communication. Military 
satellite communication (MILSATCOM) capacity alone was insufficient in meeting the 
information dissemination requirements and was augmented by commercial satellite 
communication (COMSATCOM) assets.  
1. Satellite Communication Growth Trends 
Due to end-user requirements, DOD procured COMSATCOM services as needed 
to augment MILSATCOM. COMSATCOM evolved from a complementary capability to 
a critical element of the DOD SATCOM architecture (U.S. Strategic Command, 2013). 
According to the Defense Business Board (2013), DOD views SATCOM as mission 
essential in providing the warfighter the communication resources needed in current areas 
of operations and new missions in new geographies. As shown in Figure 2, the DOD has 
significantly increased MILSATCOM’s capacity in an effort to satisfy growing 
information demands placed on dispersed units conducting distributed operations.  
 
 Military Satellite Capacity (from Defense Business Board, 2013) Figure 2. 
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As stated in Taking Advantage of Opportunities for Commercial Satellite 
Communications Services (2013), SATCOM meets the following warfighter 
requirements: interoperability; global coverage; assured, real-time access; capacity; 
protection; and flexibility. As COMSATCOM capabilities continue to expand, DOD’s 
maximization of industry innovation and continued integration promote Joint Force 2020 
Capstone Concept of highly-networked forces connected by redundant and diverse 
communication links (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012).  
At sea, the Navy relies on the full integration of MILSATCOM and 
COMSATCOM in order to perform its global presence mission. The continued 
procurement of more COMSATCOM by the DOD is critical in order for the Navy to not 
only support the current operational requirements but to be postured for rapid response  
to future crisis. About 60 percent is used every day worldwide; the other 40 percent is 
sitting out there as surge that is bought ahead of time when the Navy repositions ships to 
an area where bandwidth is needed (C. Racoosin, classroom lecture, August 19, 2014). 
 In 2009, this provided a total of 258 megabits per second throughput for the entire  
naval fleet.  
From Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 to FY 2011, DOD COMSATCOM procurement cost 
increased from $990 million to $1.216 billion (C. Racoosin, classroom lecture, August 
19, 2014). The additional $226 million in FY 2011 was the total of the combined cost 
increase in total satellite services. Fixed satellite services (FSS) expenditures increased 30 
percent from $673 million in FY 2010 to $875 million in FY 2011; as well as, DOD’s 
bandwidth usage increased 15 percent (C. Racoosin, classroom lecture, August 19, 2014). 
The DOD’s traditional primary investment in FSS was due in part to its high throughput 
capacity using relatively stationary terminals; as opposed to mobile satellite services 
(MSS) comparatively lower throughput capability over mobile ground terminals. In FY 
2011, MSS expenditures consumed 27 percent of the total DOD COMSATCOM budget, 
which equated to an 8 percent increase from FY2010 ($304.2 million) to FY2011 ($328 
million) (U.S. Strategic Command, 2013).  
The recent decade-long conflict highlighted a need to increase capabilities for 
disadvantaged users whose growing requirement to receive, process, and disseminate 
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information relied on an antiquated communication asset that interfaced solely with MSS. 
Consequently, the demand for higher bandwidth capable smaller portable ground 
receivers emerged. The physical size distinction is becoming less relevant today as 
smaller, portable terminals support FSS band frequencies; as well as, MSS solutions 
increasingly provide higher throughput capacity (U.S. Strategic Command, 2013). These 
highly capable portable terminals are able to be outfitted with smaller and smaller 
antennas. 
The introduction of highly mobile smaller ground terminals capable of accessing 
higher band frequencies normally associated with FSS (C, Ka, Ku, and X) addressed the 
growing requirement to disseminate high bandwidth consuming products to/from the 
tactical level. In particular, as shown in Figure 3, Ka band operates between the 26.5 GHz 
and 40 GHz range of frequencies allowing for higher bandwidth allocation for deployed 
forces (C. Racoosin, classroom lecture, August 19, 2014). Expeditionary forces using 
portable ground receivers such as the PRC-117F/G were able to push/pull data products 
via Ka-band at higher rates of speed.  
 
 Ka-Band Capability and Trends (from C. Racoosin, classroom Figure 3. 
lecture, August 19, 2014) 
2. Information Dissemination Trends 
The concept of delivering C4ISR to the tactical edge has been explored by the 
military and commercial industry in an effort to enhance the capabilities of users in a DIL 
environment. The DOD observed during the recent wars that demands levied on small 
units and its leadership created situations where the timely delivery of information was 
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the difference between life and death. As portrayed in Figure 4, the information 
collection requirements grows exponentially up the chain of command requiring edge 
units to use multiple disconnected systems to meet the requirement.  
Power to the Edge is a result of technological advances that will eliminate 
the constraint of bandwidth, free us from the need to know a lot in order to 
share a lot, unfetter us from the requirement to be synchronous in time and 
space, and remove the last remaining technical barriers to information 
sharing and collaboration. (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. xiii) 
 
 Information Flow Up/Down USMC Echelons of Command  Figure 4. 
(from Naval Research Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 6) 
Throughout the years, the DOD implemented several concepts in order to 
overcome the information dissemination limitations that lightweight highly mobile users 
faced when deployed to tactical environments as represented in Figure 5.  
 
 Maturation of Warfighter Communication Capabilities  Figure 5. 
(from Liguori & Daniel, 2013, p. 27) 
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With the initial primary focus on the delivery of information, the DOD adopted 
the smart push concept. This concept empowered the owner of the information and relied 
on the owner’s judgment when deciding what information is important to whom. This 
concept faced bandwidth and throughput challenges; as well as, time synchronization 
challenges when advantaged users attempted to correspond with disadvantaged users. 
The smart push required that the recipient had to be listening at the exact point in time in 
which the sender was transmitting as well as close enough for the equipment to remain 
synchronized.  
Further technological advancements in communication equipment improved 
range limitations and introduced the broadcast capability in the smart push. This allowed 
commanders to distribute forces to the tactical edge and push information to them 
through mobile listening devices without concern for spatial proximity. The problem of 
knowing what information to send and the requirement for the edge unit to be available in 
a dynamically changing environment to receive it was not addressed until the advent of 
the email system. This technological breakthrough eliminated the need to maintain 
complete synchronization; however, the sender was still required to decide what 
information was important to the people that relied on it.  
Finally, network connectivity and shared information resources enabled the 
migration to smart pull; this removed the owner-to-requestor time synchronization and 
the need for information owners to know exactly what is needed and how to get it to the 
requesting party (Alberts et al., 2003, p. xiv). This concept shifted the problem that was 
associated with the smart push in the sender-to-receiver relationship. The owner of the 
information was no longer responsible for time synchronization with the intended 
recipient. Although smart pull is described as an improvement to the smart push concept, 
this method of information dissemination presents its own set of problems. Operating 
under the smart pull construct, the actor that needs actionable intelligence is now required 
to know: a. the location of all the gathered sources of raw data in order to perform 
operational/intelligence fusion or b. the location of the resultant processed valuable 
information and when it was generated. Now, the commander is responsible for 
determining what information is critical for mission success. Unfortunately, this 
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capability is not possible since the commander is unable to anticipate the composition of 
the fused information as this process is dynamic and based on anticipated events and state 
changes. Instead, the responsibility is assigned to the intelligence fusion center (IFC), 
where analysis is performed across diverse sources of information in order to produce the 
requisite knowledge needed to support mission sets. The IFC eliminates the requirement 
for the tactical edge units to obtain, train, and equip a data fusion cell tasked with finding 
the relevant information among all the available information; especially since, the 
commander is unaware of the origin and the type of sensors that were used in order to 
gather the raw data (Naval Research Advisory Committee, 2012).  
3. DOD Information Technology Focus 
DOD has explored ways to remove the general computing resources from devices 
that are supporting edge users to somewhere else in the network in order to alleviate the 
saturation of scarce computing capacity. Alberts et al. (2003, p. 192) stated “a 
dismounted infantry-person’s information resources could be a thin client dedicated to 
supporting a rich human-computer interface [with voice recognition, heads-up display, 
speech synthesis, and communications]” (Alberts et al., 2003, p. 192). With the end goal 
of increasing capability to the edge user, DOD has conducted experiments with cloud 
computing to identify and mitigate network issues in expeditionary units in deployed 
environments. Since 2012, the U.S. Army has tested and evaluated the feasibility of 
delivering increased C2 capability to the tactical edge using a cloud-based platform 
(Welsh, 2012). 
According to Powell (2013, pp. 6–7), the tests were designed to eliminate the 
prevailing degradation of network connectivity that Soldiers experienced once they 
transitioned from a garrison network to a tactical network. The intent is to leverage 
technology and develop a strategy using cloud computing that will revolutionize C2 
down to the tactical edge by employing high computing capacity smart hand-held 
devices. This would provide the edge units with the agility needed, as Kundra’s Federal 
Cloud Computing Strategy (2011, p. 5) stated, to spend less time focusing on sustaining 
and maintaining highly intricate communication equipment and more time dedicated to 
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mission essential tasks. Removing the requirement to perform network management at 
the tactical level through the use of user enabled discriminatory access to shared 
infrastructure presented an appealing case to the DOD CIO leadership. Traditionally, the 
focus was to deliver an IT capability that centered around an optimally configured 
hardware and software solution; however, the shift in mindset in the cloud computing 
model for providing IT as a service is concentrated on the user as depicted in Figure 6 
(Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012a, p. 2).  
 
 Shift in IT Focus (Naval Research Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 19) Figure 6. 
4. Mobile Device Strategy for DOD 
As the lead for developing policy and disseminating guidance to the Marine Corps 
Chief Information Officer, the DOD Chief Information Officer distributed the DOD 
Mobile Device Strategy that focused on “improving three areas critical to mobility: 
wireless infrastructure, the mobile device itself, and mobile applications” (Office of the 
Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012b, p. i). These improvements are 
essential to empowering deployed personnel with faster access to information and 
computing power in spite of their geographical dispersion (Office of the Department of 
Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012b, p. i). One approach to achieving this goal 
requires focusing on the fourth critical area absent in the DOD CIO guidance to the 
Marine Corps CIO which is to ensure persistent connectivity between the cloud and the 
mobile device though the use of cloud technology and cloudlets. Cloudlets are tactically 
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forward deployed well-connected datacenters in a box that are positioned at the tactical 
edge for mobile device users operating in a DIL environment. Cloud technology and 
cloudlets are a viable conceptual option that provides “a reliable, high-bandwidth, end-to-
end network” (Satyanarayanan et al., 2013, p. 40). The use of cloud technology and 
cloudlets would eliminate the inherent latency edge users experience as they attempt to 
retrieve critical information in real-time. In addition, the benefits provided by 
implementing cloud technology and cloudlets would enhance the tactical unit’s ability to 
operate mobile devices in a contested environment. The effects of an enemy’s attempt to 
perform denial of service (DoS) attacks through wireless jamming is minimized due to 
their (cloudlet and mobile device) close proximity and wireless technology (ultra-short-
range) employed.  
In order to ensure all components of DOD were focused in the development 
efforts toward the same end goal, the DOD Mobile Device Strategy provided the 
following definition: 
A mobile device is a handheld computing device with a display screen that 
allows for user input. When connected to a network, it enables decision 
making via collaborative planning in forms formats specially designed to 
maximize the use of information given device limitations. Popular model 
designs for mobile devices are smartphones and tablets. (Office of the 
Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012b, p. i) 
Although information sharing is important, the real value of the mobile device is 
achieved when it is able to incorporate the tactical warfighter in the D2D process. Using 
the persistent connection to the cloudlet, the edge user can use the hosted sensor 
applications on the mobile device to conduct battlefield assessments in support of BFSA; 
as well as, receive intelligently fused information needed to perform last-mile re-
planning. Leveraging mobile device, cloud, and cloudlet technology for the 
aforementioned military application would facilitate decentralized C2; as well as, 
autonomous decision-making at the edge (Reddy, 2012).  
Due to their relatively inexpensive nature, mobile devices have provided much of 
today’s mobile society with an on-demand information obtaining capability. As such, the 
DOD intends to leverage mobile device capabilities and employ them in ways to improve 
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tactical operations. The recent use of mobile devices by organizations to provide 
information in support of global situation awareness during events such as natural 
disasters; serve as example use cases for testing mobile devices in expeditionary 
environments (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012b). 
As described in Figure 7, the DOD intends to evolve the enterprise by strengthening the 
DOD workforce through mobile device integration; along with developing and 
employing web-enabled applications. 
  
 DOD Mobile Device Strategy Goals (from Office of the Department Figure 7. 
of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012b, p. 1) 
5. Mobile Device Strategy for USMC 
In 2013, the Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers 
(C4), Brigadier General Nally stated “with increasing mobile device capabilities, the 
Marine Corps recognizes the trend of evolving information needs within garrison and 
tactical environments and the need to provide an agile method of meeting those needs” 
(Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4), 2013). Just as 
the DOD wants to untether the workforce from the desk in an office by enabling the end 
user—equipped with a mobile device—to maintain connectivity to shared information 
and computing power without degradation of capability, the Marine Corps desires to 
remove the overreliance on the stationary ground satellite located at the FOB. Currently, 
edge users experience a degrading autonomous decision-making capability as they 
transition from a fixed location; to vehicle-borne; to foot-mobile. The increased ability 
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for highly mobile users to access, share, and manipulate knowledge enhances their 
capability to deduce courses of actions in support of FOA and FOM (Director for 
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4), 2013). In spite of 
geographical location, mobile devices would enable key leadership collaboration among 
throughout the planning process for contingency and crisis operations order development 
as illustrated in Figure 8. The global distribution of actionable intelligence to decision-
makers reduce the time required in the D2D cycle (Director for Command, Control, 
Communications and Computers (C4), 2013).  
 
 Marine Corps Planning Process (from Marine Corps Combat Figure 8. 
Development Command, 2008) 
In a fiscally constrained environment, scarce resources are focused on user 
requirements and technology improvements that will affect more rapid mission 
accomplishment. The individual user and the user requirements have been a driving force 
in the shift of focus. In order for the Marine Corps to successfully implement the 
Commercial Mobile Device Strategy, the following four goals must be met: “1) Establish 
a Secure Mobile Framework; 2) Transition the Unclassified Mobile Device Infrastructure 
to a Cost Effective and Platform Agnostic Environment; 3) Collaborate with DOD and 
Industry Partners to Develop a Classified Mobile Device Capability; and 4) Incorporate 
Personally Owned Mobile Devices” (Director for Command, Control, Communications, 
and Computers (C4), 2013, p. 3).  
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a. USMC Guidance  
The Marine Corps recognized that fused intelligence products are a prerequisite to 
the D2D process. There exists a need to improve the user decision centricity capability at 
the tactical edge in order to promote independent and real-time response when operating 
in a dynamic environment. This will assist the Marine Corps in remaining capable of 
operating as a decentralized expeditionary force. The continued emphasis toward 
improving the C2 capability at the lowest level is essential to the operational posture of a 
mobile force. MCDP-6 states: 
No single activity in war is more important than command and control. 
Command and control by itself will not drive home a single attack against 
an enemy force. It will not destroy a single enemy target. It will not affect 
a single emergency resupply. Yet none of these essential warfighting 
activities, or any others, would be possible without effective command and 
control. Without command and control, campaigns, battles, and organized 
engagements are impossible, military units degenerate into mobs, and the 
subordination of military force to policy is replaced by random violence. 
In short, command and control is essential to all military operations and 
activities. (U.S. Marine Corps, 1996, p. 35) 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) (2013) stated C2 
consists of personnel, information, processes, and the logistical support which enable 
actionable intelligence from the collection and analysis of raw data. MCCDC’s guidance 
was to migrate from a focus on the system of systems (SoS) capability in favor of a 
decision-centric user focused network enabled C2 capability that supported decentralized 
and distributed Enhanced Company Operations (Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, 2013). 
b. Naval Philosophy 
After prolonged land based wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps’ 
maritime strategy reaffirmed its commitment to a fully integrated naval capability 
(Conway, 2008, p. 9). Forward thinking, the Marine Corps’ future modernization 
programs for communication equipment and weapon systems are being designed to 
increase the capacity for expeditionary forces to conduct ship to shore operations 
(Conway, 2008, p. 9). Sea based tactical units, conducting initial operations without 
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external host nation support in underdeveloped harsh environments, are capable of 
strategic power projection in defense/support of U.S. allies in contested regions (Conway, 
2008, p. 10). Navy Tactical Reference Publication 1–02 (2012) defines sea base as  
an inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, 
networked platforms that enables the global power projection of offensive 
and defensive forces from the sea and includes the ability to assemble, 
equip, project, support, and sustain those forces without reliance on land 
bases within the joint operations area. (U.S. Navy, 2012, p. 2–74)  
The maneuverability and agility afforded by operating from sea is nullified by 
legacy communication equipment incapable of keeping pace with the information 
collection and dissemination demands necessary for shared situation awareness between 
the at Sea Commander and the Ground Force Commander. In an effort to eliminate the 
information disconnect between forces, the Navy and Marine Corps have developed the 
Single Naval Battle Concept.  
An essential component of the Single Naval Battle Concept is an inter-service 
commercial applications based cloud topology (Naval Cloud) that leverage innovative 
technology (Naval Research Advisory Committee, 2012). As shown in Figure 9, the 
Marine Corps’ recognition of the benefits gained by using mobile device applications—
coupled with the flexibility and scalability of cloud technology—has generated 
specifications designed to enhance information dissemination to the disadvantaged user 
(Naval Research Advisory Committee, 2012). Successful implementation will support the 
facilitation of information aggregation and delivery requirements placed upon mobile 
commanders operating in DIL environments.  
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 Single Naval Battle Concept (from Naval Research Advisory Figure 9. 
Committee, 2012, p. 15) 
Marine Corps focused mobility requirements—such as smart reduction of the 
information that needs to be transported—must be identified in mobile device capability 
development. There are two factors that must be considered: a. the limiting resource is 
bandwidth and b. extracting and taking the most valuable information forward. One 
approach is to automatically summarize information based on its prioritization through 
the use of self-aware transport middleware. By being aware of dynamically changing 
bandwidth, this device could provision information at different levels of granularity while 
optimally using available network bandwidth. For example, edge users operating in a DIL 
environment further degraded by A2AD threats still have requirements for 
meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) data. Although normally viewed in a 
bandwidth intensive high resolution state, a self-aware transport middleware would adjust 
for current bandwidth conditions/priority and display a lower resolution METOC product 
in order to ensure the warfighter received something.  
In spite of capturing and adapting commercial advances as well as 
leveraging the work of the Army NETT Warrior initiative, Marine Corps 
strategy and operating concepts must involve special considerations and 
constraints for information delivery to the ‘Marine on the move’, which 
are unlikely to evolve from commercial or Army doctrine concepts. 
(Naval Research Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 11)  
General Conway stated the future Corps will reestablish its naval presence at sea, 
remain a multipurpose expeditionary entity, and remain receptive to innovation and new 
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technology (Conway, 2008, p. 19). This shift in focus from land-based occupation to a 
rapidly deployable agile force operating from ship-to-shore will require unique C4ISR 
capabilities similar to special operation forces (SOF). The Marine Corps is focused on 
integrating and delivering C4ISR down to the squad level to provide small unit leaders 
with the required knowledge needed to make critical autonomous decisions at decisive 
points in battle (Conway, 2008, p. 20). General Conway acknowledged the significant 
efforts made in the past decade to deliver this capability above the company level; 
however, emphasized its requirement below the company level due to current equipment 
limitations (Conway, 2008, p. 20). Due to the harsh operating environment at the tactical 
edge, legacy communication systems are inept at delivering these mission critical 
capabilities. As such, the Marine Corps confirmed its pledge to aggressively pursue 
integrated lightweight mobile devices that deliver V2D capabilities to the Marine at the 
edge (Conway, 2008, p. 20). 
6. Capability Gaps 
In the past, the priority for DOD was to deliver V2D capability to commanders at 
fortified FOBs via high bandwidth/throughput ground-based networked SoS. Effectively, 
the C4ISR assets increased the data fusion and analysis capabilities; as well as, increased 
the capacity of information that could be gathered and submitted to HHQ. Mobile users 
that conducted operations away from the FOB experienced an instant degradation in their 
ability to collect and report information vital to situation awareness due to unreliable, low 
data throughput, voice radio assets. “A reliable and robust information gathering and 
decision-support system cannot exist without the capacity to access, verify, and combine 
data and data products across multiple information types and sources” (Naval Research 
Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 9). In spite of this, the technically disadvantaged mobile 
user was still expected to feed the seemingly never-ending request for information from 
above by constructing bandwidth intensive high definition power point presentations that 
required a connectivity level resident at the well connected FOB.  
Combat Development and Integration’s (CD&I) (2012) Concept of Employment 
(COE) for Infantry Company and Below C2 (ICB-C2) document identified a data capable 
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mobile device need for enhanced company and below operations. As shown in Figure 10, 
COE for ICB-C2 identified a disparity in current equipment capabilities and stated the 
mobile device solution must have a common look and feel that enable a seamless 
transition through company employment conditions (fixed, OTM, and dismounted) 
without degradation of V2D services (Combat Development and Integration, 2012).  
 
 Company Level Information Exchange Requirements (IER) and Figure 10. 
Capabilities (from Combat Development & Integration, 2012, p. 27) 
This lack in current capability attributed to a deficiency across the MAGTF to 
distribute BFSA and reliable blue force location updates down to the peripheral units 
(Combat Development and Integration, 2012). The document also stated untimely 
incomplete information flow from the decision makers at the company level and below to 
the squad level and above limited their (company, platoon, and squad) ability to validate 
targets and non-combat desired effects in near real time (Combat Development and 
Integration, 2012). One of the elements needed in order to engage an enemy combatant is 
positive identification. In a fluid environment, the time it takes to confirm the 
identification of a known hostile could result in a capture/kill or a missed opportunity to 
detain a fleeing potential suspect. Current system capacity limitations are inadequate for 
meeting the demands of mobile units (Combat Development and Integration, 2012). Also, 
the news of positive effects accomplished by U.S. service members in an area to thwart 
the aggressive actions of malign actors can spread to other areas resulting in an 
overwhelming shift in support for U.S. service members. Without this knowledge 
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integrated into their mobile devices, U.S. service members are not able to capitalize on 
potential human intelligence. The aforementioned capability gaps could potentially be 
filled by a mobile device solution that effectively integrates information and technology 
in a disadvantaged environment as depicted in Figure 11.  
 
 Information and Technology Imperatives (from Naval Research Figure 11. 
Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 28) 
C. EXISTING C2ISR REQUIREMENTS 
Assisted by the headquarters staff, the infantry rifle company commander is 
responsible for conducting mission analysis and disseminating mission-type orders to 
subordinates (U.S. Marine Corps, 2014c). These vital tasks are performed without the 
benefit of an organic IFC or the equipment needed to collect/synthesis raw data in order 
to produce a tangible product for edge units to act upon. The infantry rifle company relies 
on the maneuverability and agility afforded by C2 to conduct offensive, defensive, 
amphibious, and stability operations as described in Figure 12.  
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 Full Spectrum Warfare Operations (from Naval Research Advisory Figure 12. 
Committee, 2012, p. 14) 
The increased demand to use infantry companies as semi-autonomous modular 
forces over prolonged periods has placed an emphasis on C2 (Combat Development and 
Integration, 2012). The Marine Corps understands that commanders use C2 to determine 
what needs to be done, execute it, and then assess the aftermath; therefore, importance 
has been placed on providing infantry company commanders with increased capabilities 
to meet current C2 requirements (U.S. Marine Corps, 2014b). The next step in the 
evolution of the infantry company is to increase their capability to participate in 
collaborative collection management by fielding and assigning organic ISR assets to the 
TO&E. “Military excellence is defined by the excellence of our Marines; their thinking, 
ability to innovate, adapt, and to overcome the challenges presented by complex 
environments, threats, and conditions” (Deputy Commandant for Combat Development 
and Integration, 2010). This has led to situations in which a reinforced company with 
augmented C2 equipment from higher echelons has been tasked to broadcast BFSA in 
order to establish unity of effort among higher, adjacent, and subordinate forces (U.S. 
Marine Corps, 2014b). Through C2, the expectation of an infantry company’s ability to 
maneuver throughout the battle space as required, execute kinetic and sustainment 
operations, and mass and deliver scalable fires capability has grown (Combat 
Development and Integration, 2012). Subsequently, the overarching mission of the end to 
end PaaS is to enable C4ISR for company and below units operating in all employment 
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functions spanning the full range of military operations (ROMO) (Combat Development 
and Integration, 2012). 
1. Equipment Capabilities 
A key component to improving the C2 D2D cycle is the integration of non-
interoperable SoS. The lack of interoperability among current stove-piped systems has 
placed an undue burden on the Marine Corps’ and its ability to perform its mission 
(Marine Corps Combat Develop Command, 2007). Shared situation awareness is directly 
proportional to the interoperability and capabilities of systems used for C2. Commanders 
gain increased agility, common operational picture, and faster decision-making through 
mutual understanding (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2007). With the 
aim of supporting tactical level commanders in all three employment conditions (fixed, 
OTM and dismounted), the equipment must be confined in a space that is man-packable, 
ruggedized, multi-band capable, and communicates beyond normal speaking range 
without compromise of location and provide confidentiality (Yang, 2011). As depicted in 
Appendix G, each echelon of command concept of employment across the full spectrum 
of warfare under the three categories is directly tied to its current communication and C2 
capabilities. 
a. Fixed Capabilities 
Employed at a stationary location, the Combat Operations Center (COC) provide 
the warfighter with C2, networking, and communication systems that support hosted 
applications unique to fires and maneuver, intelligence, logistics, and force protection 
(Combat Development and Integration, 2012).  
(1) Company Fixed Combat Operations Center (COC) 
MCRP 5–12C (2011b) defines the COC as the primary operational agency of a 
command by which assigned elements of the MAGTF are employed. Staffed with the 
requisite personnel and equipment, the COC receive and analyze information; issue 
orders; and supervise execution (U.S. Marine Corps, 2011b). The COC is designed to 
enhance lethality, improve C2, and overall mission effectiveness across ROMO (Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command, 2008, p. ES-2). As depicted in Figure 13, COC 
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capability set (CAPSET) V nodes plug in to the information rich MAGTF Tactical Data 
Network through intermittent line of sight (LOS) connections over limited data 
throughput capacity communication devices (Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, 2008).  
 
 MAGTF C2 using COC Capability Sets (CAPSET) I–V (from Figure 13. 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2008, p. ES-3) 
As represented in Figure 14, the COC is intended to give commanders and staffs 
the ability to efficiently access current and previously stored fuse intelligence products 
and transmit tactical information across all mediums using a SoS networked architecture 
(Combat Development and Integration, 2012).  
 
 COC CAPSET V Network (from Marine Corps Combat Figure 14. 
Development Command, 2008, p. 63) 
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Dictated by the commander’s mission needs, the company level fixed COC has a 
scalable configuration that can support the detailed planning and integration requirements 
of a main CP; as well as, an expeditionary forward CP (Combat Development and 
Integration, 2012, p. 21). As the requirements of the company determine the need for an 
enduring fixed operations center, all available assets to include manpack systems and 
additional stationary equipment will be used in support of the COC personnel IER 
detailed in Figure 15 (Combat Development and Integration, 2012, p. 23).  
 
 Notional Fixed Robust COC (from Combat Development and Figure 15. 
Integration, 2012, p. 23) 
Fixed COCs operating out of the back of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicles (HMMWV) or Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) with mounted tactical 
radios, manpack systems, and battlefield situation awareness provide commanders 
forward of the main COC position with C2 capabilities. As seen in the configuration in 
Figure 16, the vehicle-borne COC allows the commander to establish an alternate 




 Notional Fixed Vehicle Forward COC (from Combat Development Figure 16. 
and Integration, 2012, p. 22) 
The current fixed systems capabilities are described in Appendix F.  
b. On-the-Move (OTM) Capabilities 
Data and video communications OTM (DVCOTM) capability is essential for 
commanders to be able to maintain speed and aggression. Liguori et al. (2013, p. 40) 
stated a unit commander currently must decide between halting their assault in order to 
access real-time data and video for improved BFSA or continuing pursuit of the enemy 
with an update capability limited to legacy tactical voice. Voice alone has been 
inadequate in decreasing the time in D2D cycle. The ability for geographically dispersed 
maneuver units to access essential DVCOTM would improve decision-making and give 
companies an operational advantage over adversaries (Combat Development and 
Integration, 2012). A capability gap in legacy systems due to lack of additional resources 
to support operational maneuver units on the move is described in Appendix C.  
(1) Company OTM Combat Operation Center (COC) 
Current gaps in network capacity and throughput result in insufficient transport 
capacity while OTM. Mobility and resource constraints hinder the COC’s design from 
being based on functional activities. The company COC configuration must not be so 
cumbersome as to degrade mobility; however, it must be robust enough to allow the 
commander to effectively direct and influence subordinate forces (Combat Development 
and Integration, 2012). Furthermore, dissimilar communication systems across the variety 
of weapon platforms an infantry company can be embarked upon dictate what vehicular 
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C2 assets are available OTM (Combat Development and Integration, 2012). As illustrated 
in Figure 17, tactical radio is the only means for the commander to remain connected to 
subordinate, adjacent, and higher forces while OTM. 
  
 Notional OTM Amphibious Assault Vehicle COC (from Combat Figure 17. 
Development and Integration, 2012, p. 20) 
The current OTM vehicular systems capabilities are described in Appendix E. 
c. Dismounted Capabilities 
Communication systems provide the mobile tactical unit situation awareness and 
C2 during enemy engagement. Vehicleborne patrols are ideal for covering large 
geographical areas; however, terrain limitations can necessitate the need for foot mobile 
operations into an otherwise denied access area. If the IER calls for the use of limited 
data or a BLOS capability, then one of the man-packed or handheld variants of the PRC 
family of radios will be tasked to fulfill the mission requirements. Specifically, multiband 
radio systems such as the PRC-117F/G are C2 force multipliers due to their ability to 
enable long-haul data and voice exchange (Combat Development and Integration, 2012). 
(1) Company Dismounted Combat Operations Center (COC) 
As shown in Figure 18, the mission may dictate the formation of a foot-mobile 
COC configuration. Immediately, edge units’ access to enterprise resources is degraded 
and their primary means of communication while in motion is the IISR.  
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 Footmobile COC (from Combat Development and Integration,  Figure 18. 
2012, p. 25) 
The small, lightweight (~ 2.6 lbs) IISR was designed to provide C2 capabilities to 
the infantry squads and fire teams in tactical situations where other forms of 
communication were not feasible (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010b, p. 69). The IISR is a voice 
only radio that “acts as a wireless intercom” system (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010b, p. 69). 
The gap in data capabilities are overcome by the use of the PRC-117F/G. Unlike the IISR 
voice only capability, the PRC-117F/G provides the tactical edge user with voice and 
limited data throughput capabilities. Effectively eliminating the continuous mobility of 
the dismounted COC, the PRC-117F/G and its SATCOM antenna must be set up and 
remain stationary throughout the duration of its operation as depicted in Figure 19. The 
BFSA advantages gained from having access to data has resulted in the carrying of both 
radio systems when missions require the infantry company to disperse subordinate 
platoons and squads throughout their assigned AOR (Combat Development and 
Integration, 2012).  
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 PRC-117F SATCOM Employment (from Public Affairs Office of Figure 19. 
the New Jersey Department of Military and  
Veteran Affairs, 2009, p. 28) 
D. FUTURE CONCEPTS AND MANDATES 
The IER of the expeditionary warfighter requires a DaaS/PaaS that provide V2D 
capability without a combat load increase to the user. As Coakley (1992, p. 79) pointed 
out, the problem is the “C2 equipment designed to sharpen a combat unit’s ‘teeth’ also 
tends to swell its support ‘tail’.” Commander’s outfitted with enhanced C4ISR 
capabilities also require an increase in specialized trained operators and maintenance 
personnel (van Creveld, 1985, p. 239). Critical to this is the acquisition of C2 systems 
that improve upon and interoperate with legacy C2 systems. Leveraging emerging 
technology that provides battlefield situation awareness reduces uncertainty and assists 
the commander with knowledge perception. The DaaS/PaaS requirement is the successful 
integration of transmission systems, networking systems, applications, and end-user 
devices that eliminates a degradation of capability as the warfighter traversed the 
employment functions (fixed, OTM, dismounted) (Combat Development and Integration, 
2012). 
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1. Cloud Platform Solution 
In Appendix K, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
described three service models for delivering an IT. Cloud platforms provide a way to 
distribute state-of-the-art, effective, and secure C4ISR capability to an edge user’s mobile 
device (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2012a, p. E-1). 
Unfortunately, mobile devices are resource-poor due to physical limitations that inhibit 
maximizing computational capabilities. As stated by Satyanarayanan M., Bahl, P., 
Caceres, R., and Davies N. (2009, p. 3) “a mobile device could execute a resource-
intensive application on a distant high-performance compute server or compute cluster 
and support thin-client user interactions with the application over the Internet.” This can 
be achieved by connecting the mobile device to a resource-rich well-connected cloudlet; 
ultimately, providing the edge user with critical real-time fused intelligence products at 
their fingertips. A need for the aforementioned and alike capability results in the 
warfighter generating requirements for the PaaS infrastructure layer resulting in fielded 
integrated C4ISR applications that are tailored to various mission sets. Applications such 
as facial, speech, and language recognition provide credibility in claims of nefarious acts 
performed by an assailant. In order for these resource intense applications to provide real-
time interactive response to tactical edge units, there exist a need for “low-latency, one-
hop, high bandwidth wireless access to the cloudlet” (Satyanarayanan et al., 2009, p. 6).  
In addition to the service models described by NIST, DaaS is viewed as an 
enabling layer for the PaaS layer since it is a collection of data services that are interfaced 
from the PaaS model. DaaS is a form of cloud computing service that uses application 
programming interfaces (API) to deliver data on demand to consumers; however, it does 
place a concern on the quality of data and the data life cycle as seen in Table 1 (Vu, 





Table 1.   DaaS Capability Concerns (from Truong et al., 2009, p. 90) 
Quality of Data Timeline Describes the lifetime of the data 
Up-to-date Indicates the lag time of the of the data up to the 
current time  
Completeness Describes whether the data has missing values 
Granularity Describes the degree of data granularity 
Data Life cycle Backup/Recovery Describes whether and how the data will be 
backed up, and to which degree and how long 
the data can be recovered if the data was lost 
Distribution Describes whether the data will be distributed 
externally 
Disposition Describes whether the data will be relocated or 
retained according to defined or lawful policies 
 
The benefit of a local DaaS/PaaS model at the company level to the mobile 
warfighter is adding flexibility to the requirement to retrieve and store massive data 
stores on the edge device. With local DaaS/PaaS model it will become possible to 
perform subsequent searches for the needed time sensitive information critical to D2D 
process by incrementally updating data views stored in a device knowledge cache with 
incremental events stored at the local DaaS/PaaS model. This is performed during the 
execution of the same query or simple retrieval. DaaS/PaaS model provides the desired 
data through the use of query and “call the corresponding APIs to retrieve the data” (Vu 
et al., 2012, p. 605), as seen in Figure 20.  
 
 DaaS Service Operation (from Truong et al., 2010, p. 365) Figure 20. 
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This data can either be static with little to no change (e.g., an alpha roster of 
currently assigned personnel) or it can be volatile with constant changes (e.g., sensory 
data collected for the conduct of BFSA). The create, retrieve, update, and delete CRUD 
capability found in DaaS pose concerns about data sources and service context as 
outlined in Table 2 and Table 3. 
Table 2.   Data Management Concerns in DaaS  
(from Truong et al., 2009, p. 91) 
Name Describes where the data is obtained 
Size Describes the volume of the data 
Timespan Describes the time duration in which the data is collected 
Update Frequency Describes how often the data is updated 
Meta-data Describes domain-specific standards that the data follows 
 
Table 3.   Service/Mission Context Concerns in DaaS  
(from Truong et al., 2009, p. 91) 
Location Describe where a DaaS is hosted 
Service Type Describe whether the service is based on SOAP or REST 
Level of Service Describes whether the service is best effort or guaranteed 
Data Classification Describe the taxonomy characterizing the data provided by the 
service 
 
In spite of these concerns, company and below BFSA are enabled by the data 
creation and retrieval capability. As edge users actively evaluate the dynamically 
changing landscape, they rely on all available sensor mechanisms (vision, smell, hearing, 
and touch) to shape their physical world model (PWM). The accumulation of data is 
processed by the human mind and creates a cognitive world model (CWM). Both PWM 
and CWM work in concert and constantly update in response to changing environmental 
factors. This combination has been the traditional means by which warfighters have 
operated in contested DIL environments. The successful integration of C4ISR at the 
tactical level enables integrating devices with computational processing power capable of 
performing retrieval and queries. Retrieval occurs when the requestor knows the location 
of the metadata. Query-retrieval process is when exploitation is performed by the 
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requestor, using a meta-data management tool, to discover the meta-data and then 
followed by retrieval based on known meta-data.  
The presentation of the digital world model (DWM) on a mobile device will 
either compliment PWM/CWM or contradict them. In the event of a contradiction, 
advanced analytics is required to exam the existing discrepancy(s). The DWM 
graphically displayed should be the result of a properly designed extract, transform, and 
load (ETL) system. “ETL is the process of extracting data from homogeneous or 
heterogeneous data sources, transforming the data for storage in the proper format or 
structure for querying and analysis purposes, and loading the data into the final target – 
such as a database, data store, data mart, or data warehouse” (Taft, 2015). The edge user 
with all three models has the constant ability to analyze the fluid environment and reduce 
the unknowns. 
2. Requirements for Current Alternative Technologies  
As detailed in Figure 21, Naval Research Advisory Committee (2012, p. 13) 
determined continuous innovation in new technologies is needed to meet the future 
demands of the tactical unit’s IER. With the ever increasing threats to security in a fluid 
and changing environment, the warfighter requires access to intelligently fused shared 
information that is survivable against cybersecurity threats. The focus is on an enterprise 
end-to-end architecture that will “improve the user’s ability to share information on 
architecture content; enable rapid access to actionable information to support strategic 
decisions; and increase agility to address unforeseen requirements supporting warfighting 
needs” (Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer, 2006, p. 3). The 
DOD CIO does not address the increased requirement to share information across 
security levels as in the case of ISR dissemination. Successful C2 requires integration 
with ISR in order to provide the decision-maker with SA.  
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 Future Force Implications  Figure 21. 
(from Naval Research Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 13) 
Future C2, as described by Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(2013), will be performed by highly decentralized geographically distributed nodes in a 
dynamically fluid environment able to convey commander’s intent. Addressing the 
current shortcomings of existing equipment capabilities, new systems are expected to 
provide LOS, OTM, and BLOS connectivity that creates a common operational picture 
between dispersed commanders vertically and horizontally linked as shown in Figure 22 
(Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2013). Furthermore, they must include 
the necessary transmission systems and communication architecture for edge units to 
access voice, text, graphics, or video sources located at the upper echelons in order to 
satisfy their IER (Combat Development and Integration, 2012).  
 
 Future Design for Company C2 Capabilities (from Combat Figure 22. 
Development and Integration, 2012, p. 18) 
 39
According to the NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, a cloud computing 
infrastructure has the following critical characteristics: “on-demand self-service; broad 
network access; resource pooling; rapid elasticity; and measured service” (Mell & 
Grance, 2011, p. 2). The continued focus needs to remain on enhanced data-centric 
communication systems that extend C2 applications to the peripheral tactical locations 
operating at long ranges away from the enterprise communication hub (Combat 
Development and Integration, 2012). “In addition, this type of network architecture will 
provide a common computing environment that will provide cross-device interoperability 
– with the apps providing interoperability and standardization” (Naval Research Advisory 
Committee, 2012, p. 25). Depicted in Appendix L, the USMC MAGTF C2 Roadmap 
outlined the major characteristics of future communication systems that will enable the 
future vision of C2. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND TRANSITION TO REQUIREMENTS 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter has demonstrated three major themes: 
 IER have revealed gaps in current capabilities as denoted previously in 
capability gaps 
 Current C2 capability requirements have surpassed existing equipment 
capabilities 
 Investing now in cloud technologies in support of disadvantaged users at 
the tactical edge to operate in a decision making role, even under D-DIL 
condition is essential to meeting the C2 requirements of the future  
The perceived gap in a tactical edge unit’s BFSA and C2 ability due to the 
degradation of V2D equipment capability and accessibility when deployed in the 
following conditions: fixed—OTM—dismounted require an analysis of a future 
alternative. Chapter III will analyze and compare current equipment capabilities with a 
PaaS and mobile device equipment solution.  
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III. REQUIREMENTS AND ANALYSIS 
The current operating environments for which company level communications 
take place leverage multiple communication assets to meet the needs of an information 
saturated environment. The assets provide key communication links to subordinate and 
higher echelon units and decision makers allowing for quicker responses which could 
prevent loss of life. According to the 2014 USMC Total Force Structure Management 
System Unit TO&E Report, Marines assigned to an Infantry Company are outfitted with 
176 Personal Radio Communications (PRC) 153 integrated intra-squad radios (IISR), two 
Army Navy Vehicle Radio Communications (AN/VRC) 110s, one AN/VRC-114, four 
Army Navy Personal Radio Communications (AN/PRC) 117G(V)2s, and six AN/PRC-
117F(V)1C (U.S. Marine Corps, 2014c). These assets provide very specific capabilities 
and when combined in different operating configurations, provide the company and 
below with capabilities with limited effectiveness due to distance and environmental 
conditions. The different operating configurations consist of fixed, OTM and dismounted 
operating environments. In reference to Appendix G, certain form factors are used for the 
varying array of operating structures in regards to the company, platoon and squad. Each 
configuration leverages the aforementioned communication assets to provide reliable 
communications for C2 and assist decision makers. 
A. COMPANY COC FIXED, OTM AND DISMOUNTED 
According to section 6.1.1.2 of the COE for ICB2, “The company COC is 
configurable depending on the mission and commander preferences, which includes 
consideration for the required COC personnel and the associated systems” (Combat 
Development and Integration, 2012). With this in mind, the company COC can be 
prescribed as aforementioned based on several factors obtained from intelligence or 
based on requirements given for the mission. Accordingly, a company will employ 
manpack, vehicle and stationary communication systems to meet the requirements in 
place by the company or battalion commander but are limited to the specifications of the 
communication asset. In accordance with the company guard chart, various channels are 
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needed for C2 such as Tactical Net One (TAC1), TAC2, Company Command Net (CO 
CMD), Battalion (BN CMD), Fires, Safety and Intelligence (Intel). An example of a 
company guard chart is provided in Figure 23. 
 
 Sample Company Guard Chart Figure 23. 
Providing base communications for a company, whether in a fixed, OTM or 
dismounted environment, to meet current information requirements, the employment of 
multiple radio systems (in both manpack and vehicle configuration) to operate tactical 
radio channels is required. The PRC family of radios provide capabilities such as Ultra-
High Frequency (UHF) channels for LOS communication, Very High Frequency (VHF) 
channels for within approximately five miles of the company, High Frequency (HF) 
channels for BLOS communication and Super High Frequency (SHF) for SATCOM 
channels. The channels provide the company with the base amount of architecture 
required for minimal services (voice and data) for C2. 
As time and requirements have shifted in the data saturated environment in 
CONUS, it is logical to be able to provide these services to the tactical edge. Currently, 
HF channels provide a negligible amount of data capability to the company and do not 
satisfy the requirements for exchange of DISN services such as SIPRNet and NIPRNet. 
Currently, the only way for the company to obtain these services are in a fixed position. 
They are required to operate robust data architectures which require a significantly 
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increased amount of data exchange with either the controlling battalion or from a 
Standardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP) site. Since these services must be obtained 
from units or sites at a great distance, usually BLOS or over-the-horizon, the requirement 
for more robust systems, temporarily loaned equipment such as a Support Wide Area 
Network (SWAN), MRC-145, WPPL or VSAT must be utilized. Table 4 presents the 
resident equipment for a Company based on their assigned equipment and equipment 
relinquished from higher echelon commands for basic C2 and reporting requirements 
from higher echelon commands. 
Table 4.   Current Equipment and Capability Matrix 







PRC-117F V/U/SAT ≤ 40km/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 64kbps Resident Yes All 
PRC-117G V/U/SAT ≤ 40km/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 5mbps Resident Yes All 
PRC-148 V/U/SAT ≤ 2km/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 16kbps Resident Yes OTM/DIS 
PRC-150 HF/VHF Indf/ ≤10mls Both ≤ 9.6kbps Resident Yes All 
PRC-152 V/U/SAT ≤10mls/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 56kbps Resident Yes All 
PRC-153 UHF 1–5 mls Voice Only N/A Resident Yes All 
SWAN SHF Indf Data ≤ 2.5mbps Loaned No FX 
WPPL SHF ≤50mls Data ≤ 50mbps Loaned No FX 
VSAT SHF Indf Data ≤ 10mbps Loaned No FX 
MRC-142 UHF ≤ 35 mls Both ≤16.64mbps Loaned No FX 
MRC-145 V/U/SAT ≤ 40km/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 5mbps Resident Yes FX/OTM 
MRC-148 HF/VHF Indf/ ≤10mls Both 
≤ 
19.2kbps Resident Yes FX/OTM 
VRC-110 V/U/SAT ≤10mls/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 56kbps Resident Yes FX/OTM 
VRC-111 V/U/SAT ≤ 2km/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 16kbps Resident Yes FX/OTM 
VRC-112 V/U/SAT ≤10mls/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 56kbps Resident Yes FX/OTM 
VRC-113 V/U/SAT ≤ 2km/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 16kbps Resident Yes FX/OTM 
VRC-114 V/U/SAT ≤ 40km/ LOS/Indf Both ≤ 5mbps Resident Yes FX/OTM 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, all high bandwidth assets require being loaned from 
higher echelon commands. As well, Marines required to operate the gear must also be 
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attached since resident MOSs are not present at the subordinate commands such as a 
Company and below. The need for increased bandwidth and flexibility on the battlefield 
arises from the concentration of effort found in garrison training environments and its use 
of commercial and governmental networks. As stated previously, the Marine Corps has 
developed and adopted various systems and applications to assist commanders in 
improving the decision-making and information dissemination cycle but falter in making 
those applications and resources available to Marines on the tactical edge.  
B. FUTURE COMPANY, PLATOON AND SQUAD REQUIREMENTS 
Future operating environments in concert with new technologies will be the 
standard where the D2D cycle is reduced to minimums and not restricted by the 
availability of applications and systems used to train. Utilizing PaaS to make GOTS SoS 
highly available via SaaS to provide availability of systems and applications is the logical 
approach and will enhance the effectiveness of the warfighter on the tactical edge. The 
PaaS approach will be leveraged by current and future SoS and enable the warfighter to 
have complete autonomy from the Company and Battalion allowing for near real time 
updates and inputs to critical systems used to enhance BFSA. Table 5 contains systems 
and applications tactical edge personnel train with in garrison but do not utilize in combat 
environments leading to a lack of BFSA. The list is not exhaustive but contains more of 
the well-known applications and systems in use. 
Table 5.   Current Garrison and Combat Systems and Applications 









TCO Both FX Yes No Yes 
CLC2S Both FX Yes No Yes 
GCSS-MC Both FX Yes No Yes 
SPEED Both FX Yes No Yes 
AFATDS Both FX Yes No Yes 
BUCS Both OTM, DIS No Yes No 
DCGS-MC Both FX Yes No Yes 
SIP (SIPRNet) Both FX Yes Yes No 
SBUIP (NIPRNet) Both FX Yes Yes No 
CENTRIXS Cmbt FX Yes Yes No 
JBC-P Both FX Yes No Yes 
BFT Both FX, OTM No Yes No 
FMV Both FX Yes No Yes 
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As seen in Table 5, there is a capability gap between the systems and applications 
available to Company and below personnel while in a deployed environment and being in 
a fixed location compared to the availability while OTM or dismounted. The availability 
of systems and applications PaaS provides will provide key resources required for proper 
operation and functionality. It will also provide a platform to serve Marines on the 
tactical edge via a networked backbone enabling enhanced BFSA and decision making 
capabilities.  
C. THE FUTURE WITH PAAS AT THE TACTICAL EDGE 
The warfighter of today and tomorrow demands cutting edge technology 
intricately laced through the fabric of legacy and cloud-based SoS. Providing tactical 
edge personnel with PaaS will provide the capability to host and administer the 
previously listed applications presenting them to PaaS as SaaS widgets. The back-end of 
legacy SoS requires integration with PaaS/DaaS. The ability to advance legacy SoS by 
creating cloud based SoS to deploy newly developed applications should be available on 
PaaS. Having this capability by itself does not mean an enhancement of services by 
default. A detailed and complete set of requirements must be defined to better equip 
tactical edge users with the most relevant and pertinent products and services while 
reducing the overburden of multiple applications and systems providing alike 
information. The desired endstate is a warfighter equipped with valuable relevant 
information that promote enhanced C2 while reducing the D2D cycle. 
1. Application and Program, System and Device Requirements 
When all of the dust settles on the enormous amount of duplicate applications and 
programs, there is a basic level of tactical edge user requirements. The basic need is to 
have the best possible situation awareness and C2 in one place to decrease the D2D cycle 
for the person in charge. Enabling PaaS in a fixed, OTM or dismounted configuration is 
the base requirement for being able to host required components. Being able to 
administer and host all required applications and programs from a platform capable of 
operating in all three operational configurations is a must but has to be combined with 
 46
other assets to serve the need. Below is a list, separated into three categories, of the base 
requirements. 
 Applications and Programs 
 C2 Planning and Operations: graphical depiction of a SOP 
incorporating programs such as TCO, FMV, BFT and JBC-P 
 Logistics: mobile version of CLC2S or GCSS-MC with SOP with 
capability to request resources 
 ISR: ability to view PLI of friendly and enemy units (BFT), FMV 
of UAV or other technologies aggregated 
 C2 Support: capability to request CFF utilizing AFATDS and 
BUCs, CAS, MedEvac and Ground Support (food, water, 
ammunition and medical supplies) 
 Cloudlet Infrastructure 
 PaaS: provide a platform to create and host multiple applications 
supporting all range of operations and providing a SOP for all 
levels of command to obtain key data views enhancing decision 
making and reducing the D2D cycle. PaaS must be capable to 
support write-back as well as on-demand requests. SOP is expected 
to provide the necessary transparency to monitor provisioning of 
on-demand requests across command organizational hierarchy. 
Internal auditing provides an impetus for superior operational 
capabilities. 
 Networks 
 SIP (formerly SIPRNet): provide the capability to create, capture, 
manipulate, disseminate and collaborate on a secure platform. 
 SBUIP (formerly NIPRNet): provide the capability to create, 
capture, manipulate, disseminate and collaborate on an unclassified 
platform. 
 Mobile Computing Device 
 Mobile capable asset with the ability of visual presentation of 
multiple facets of the battlefield. The device must be large enough 
to legibly read and manipulate menus in combat attire. The device 
must be capable to support write-back functionality and retail full 
usability when in a DIL environment. The device must also have 
enough random access memory (RAM) to perform multiple 
operations simultaneously. 
The preceding requirements are a baseline set to guide the creation and foundation 
to equip the tactical edge user with the tools necessary to enhance and assist in shortening 
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the D2D cycle. The list of requirements is not all encompassing and represents the 
minimum to satisfy operating levels dependent on the complexity or detailed planning 
and preparation which took place prior to and during operations. Providing integration or 
incorporation with applications will provide the commonality the warfighter needs to 
maintain their efficiency and familiarity with current SoS. The ability and capability to 
request or direct actions on enemy targets is another key feature. Current applications 
provide the warfighter with the capability to direct actions on enemy targets or positions. 
By providing easily accessible icons or links for requesting theses services, it will 
decrease the time on target by automating the process. Preconfigured information can be 
stored on the mobile computing device during mission planning; therefore decreasing  
the time it takes to request all services. Another one of the services it can speed up is 
medical evacuations. Having the icon or link at your finger tip, with current PLI data 
automatically inserted and preconfigured data already in place, medical evacuations will 
be more streamlined reducing the amount of delay injured personnel must have to wait 
for life critical services. To make the most of the applications or programs listed, careful 
consideration must be taken to ensure there is as little redundancy as possible and all of 
the contents are capable of being administered on a handheld device. 
Handheld computing devices are common-place in the world today and most 
people are familiar with device usage. A mobile capable asset such as a tablet, 
smartphone or other hand-held computing device has to be incorporated into the PaaS 
solution to enhance the capabilities provided by it. The computing device must have the 
capability to interface, either wirelessly or tethered cable, with an available connection to 
the PaaS cloudlet or be able to operate from internal memory. On-device storage is one of 
two critical factors that must be taken into consideration. Storage on the device would 
permit it to maintain operational ability in a DIL environment. Security is the other 
critical issue which needs to be taken into consideration. Communications between the 
mobile device and PaaS cloudlet must be continuously monitored to ensure operational 
security is maintained. Procedures must be put in place to ensure the security of both 
wireless and wired communications as well as lost or misplaced mobile computing 
devices. 
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PaaS at the tactical edge will provide warfighters the capabilities they require to 
make timely and accurate decisions. Reducing the D2D cycle and providing key details 
on BFSA, military personnel will have the tools necessary to lead them into future 
combat situations. The possibilities for implementations and incorporation into the 
operating forces are almost endless and it will require tremendous thought, preparation, 
development and implementation to ensure maximum capabilities are deployable. 
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IV. EQUIPMENT DESIGN 
In order to provide network services to the tactical edge, a mobile device 
connection to the cloud via the cloudlet in conjunction with adaptable edge user 
warfighting applications is needed as previously described in Chapter II. As shown in 
Figure 24, connecting the mobile user with the enterprise end-to-end data architecture is 
essential to improved decision-making, BFSA, and C2 based upon all available resources.  
 
 Enterprise Information Environment (from Takai, 2012) Figure 24. 
The Naval Research Advisory Committee (2012, p. 24) projected that in the U.S. 
alone approximately 260 million smart phones will be in use by the upcoming year. As a 
result, the average recruit will arrive to basic training with their own mobile device; 
therefore, decreasing the learning curve of military variants with the same look and feel 
(Naval Research Advisory Committee, 2012, p. 24).  
A. DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS 
Previous Raytheon development of an integrated C2 solution (One Force Tactical 
Communication System [OFTCS]) consisting of a “client application, OFT server, and 
hybrid network” (tactical/commercial) serve as a viable model (Young & Ishii, 2012, p. 
1). The OFTCS architecture is designed to provide two levels of communications on both 
android based mobile devices; as well as, apple based mobile devices: 
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 Redundant, OTM warfighter communications (Young & Ishii, 2012) 
 High-speed, OTH, deployable network infrastructure (Young & Ishii, 
2012) 
The ability to deliver the above listed capabilities would satisfy the C2 
requirements of the current and future warfighter at the tactical edge. As depicted in 
Figure 25 and Figure 26, Young and Ishii (2012) determined that SOP can be achieved 
using a well-connected mobile device. 
 
 Mobile Device BFSA (from Young & Ishii, 2012) Figure 25. 
 
 Mobile Device Video Sharing (from Young & Ishii, 2012) Figure 26. 
Previous thesis research conducted by Liguori et al. (2013) focused on the need 
for a secure mobile device and the current available options to achieve this IAW DOD 
policies and directives. Therefore, the prototype design will ignore the security 
requirements and will leverage previous research as to avoid duplicative efforts.  
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B. PROTOTYPE 
The graphical user interface (GUI) of current mobile devices allows the user to 
interface with applications without having to use the command line interface. As such, 
this has become the standard by which mobile device and hosted application interact; 
thus will be the foundational design leveraged for the prototype. All opportunities to 
autofill dropdown menus will be auto-populated from the information store on the unit’s 
database. Friendly and enemy position locations are generated from a selective 
availability anti-spoofing module (SAASM) based global position system (GPS) location 
receiver either embedded or attached to the mobile device. As of 1 October 2006, 
SAASM compliant precise positioning system devices are required in all newly fielded 
DOD GPS devices (Holm, 2006). The below listed figures depict the prototype mobile 
device:  
 Figure 27 shows the startup screen and the list of warfighting applications: 
call for fire, close air support, full motion video, medical evacuation 
(MEDEVAC), logistic resupply, and situational report. 
 Figure 28 shows the call for fire home screen 
 Figure 29 shows the call for fire mobile application with drop down menu 
 Figure 30 shows the adjust fire mobile application with drop down menu  
 Figure 31 shows the close air support home screen 
 Figure 32 shows the close air support 9 line brief 
 Figure 33 shows the close air support 6 line brief 
 Figure 34 shows the full motion video home screen 
 Figure 35 shows the full motion video feed and map overlay 
 Figure 36 shows the color full motion video feed 
 Figure 37 shows the logistics support home screen 
 Figure 38 shows the air support request application 
 Figure 39 shows the ground support request application 
 Figure 40 shows the MEDEVAC home screen 
 Figure 41 shows the air MEDEVAC request application 
 Figure 42 shows the ground MEDEVAC request application 
 Figure 43 shows the situational update report home screen  
 Figure 44 shows the situational update report application 
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 Mobile Device Startup Screen  Figure 27. 
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 Call For Fire Home Screen (from Oregon, 2011) Figure 28. 
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 Call For Fire Mobile Application (from RedWireDesigns, n.d.) Figure 29. 
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 Adjust Fire Mobile Application (from J-FIRE, 2007) Figure 30. 
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 Close Air Support 9-Line (from PHOTOINDEX.W.PW, 2008) Figure 32. 
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 Close Air Support 6-Line Brief (from PHOTOINDEX.W.PW, 2008) Figure 33. 
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 Full Motion Video Home Screen Figure 34. 
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 Full Motion Video and Map Overlay Figure 35. 
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 Color Full Motion Video Feed Figure 36. 
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 Logistics Support Home Screen Figure 37. 
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 Air Support Request (from U.S. Marine Corps, 2004) Figure 38. 
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 Ground Support Request (from Department of the Army, 1993) Figure 39. 
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 MEDEVAC Home Screen Figure 40. 
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 Air MEDEVAC Request (from Department of the Army, 2000)  Figure 41. 
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 Ground MEDEVAC Request (from Department of the Army, 2000) Figure 42. 
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 Situational Update Report Home Screen Figure 43. 
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 Enemy Reconnaissance Application (from Department of the Army, Figure 44. 
2006)  
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With the aforementioned designed prototype available, an edge unit equipped 
with a mobile device is empowered with access to the critical C2ISR capabilities needed 
to decrease the D2D cycle. The intuitive nature of the graphical display allows for 
navigation between applications that may be employed during a troops-in-contact (TIC) 
situation as demonstrated in the following scenario. A squad conducted a presence patrol 
and used their mobile device to upload the route and checkpoints that would be used to 
navigate 1000 meters away from their FOB. Before departure, they were informed they 
would have overhead imagery assets (satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles) assigned 
due to the growing unrest in the area. Once outside of the FOB, they noticed a group of 
males with weapons approximately 200 meters away. The squad leader was able to 
leverage the available overhead imagery and viewed the males’ activities on the mobile 
device via the FMV application. The squad leader reported that the males were armed 
with small arms weapons to the company leadership through the SITREP update 
application. The squad was instructed to continue the patrol and to monitor the males to 
see if there is any change in behavior.  
As the squad gained ground on the stationary males, they observed several males 
take a defensive posture and obtain cover behind vehicles and buildings. Shots were fired 
from the males and the squad notified the company leadership that they were involved in 
a TIC. A member of the squad was severely injured due to the overwhelming volumes of 
fire from the direction of an abandoned one-story building. The squad relocated the 
wounded personnel to a covered position and immediately performed life-saving 
treatment. After they opened and used the MEDEVAC application to request an air 
evacuation, they switched over to the SITREP update application in order to notify the 
company headquarters. Midway through completing the update, the squad leader received 
an update in the MEDEVAC application that indicated the helicopter was 30 minutes out 
from their location. The squad leader switched back to the SITREP update application 
and picked up right where he left off at the last data entry point. The natural and man-
made objects obstructed the view of the squad; however, they were able to observe the 
assailants with the use of overhead aerial imagery. The squad leader opened the CAS 
application and used the 10-digit grid coordinates provided by the overhead aerial 
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imagery to positively identify the enemy combatants’ location. The CAS engagement 
effectively neutralized the targets and rendered them incapable of continuing to fight, 
which was monitored by the squad via the FMV application. Updates were sent to both 
the company headquarters and the inbound helicopter via the SITREP update 
application/MEDEVAC application, respectively. Although fictitious, the potential to 
encounter a complex scenario of this magnitude is a realistic possibility for units 
operating at the tactical edge.  
The prototype design by the researchers demonstrated the usefulness, in the 
aforementioned scenario, of combining a tactical cloudlet/PaaS architecture that host 
warfighting and sensor applications accessible via a mobile device. The ability to have an 
agile system that is responsive to the fluid nature of combat and is able to traverse many 
applications without degrading the warfighting capability of the end-user is critical. The 
design should enhance the user’s ability to succinctly perform multidimensional single 
data entry and query with minimal duplicative inputs as much as possible. Automation 
would effectively enhance the edge users D2D cycle in a time constrained environment 
by eliminating unnecessary manual entry and query requirements. Since the connected 
applications share information as a composite request, then data entry and query requests 
are submitted in data views with write-back.  
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V. OPERATING IN DENIED DIL (D-DIL) ENVIRONMENT 
The U.S. military must keep pace with and exploit the capabilities presented by 
the evolution of technology. As such, the desire to capitalize on the advancements made 
in the commercial sector is tapered by the requirement to negate vulnerabilities to the 
Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN). The next generation of service 
members grew up in the information age and they are accustomed to owning and 
operating mobile network computing devices with persistent connection to the Internet. 
They have an expectation that the cloud is not only available at all times but that it will 
remain available without failure. The desired end state is to make the DODIN 
synonymous with “good end-to-end network quality” with negligible cloud or loss of 
network connectivity (Satyanarayanan et al., 2013, p. 40). Unlike the commercial sector, 
the DODIN is deployed forward in hostile D-DIL environments in support of 
contingency operations; therefore, methods of employment in response to enemy threats 
require unique considerations. A capability is needed to minimize the effects of the 
enemy’s successful disconnection of the edge user to the cloud. In accordance with our 
current equipment capabilities, a severing of this connection would significantly degrade 
their ability to conduct C2 due to loss of the C4ISR capability. The researchers advocate 
a mobile device design using a tactical cloudlet/PaaS networked architecture as shown in 
Figure 45: 
A surrogate or proxy of the real cloud, located as the middle tier of a 
three-tier hierarchy: mobile device, cloudlet, and cloud. It is completely 
transparent under normal conditions, giving mobile users the illusion that 
they are directly interacting with the cloud. Under failure conditions, the 
cloudlet masks the absence of the cloud by performing its essential 
services. (Satyanarayanan et al., 2013, p. 40)  
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 Two-level Cloud Computing Architecture,  Figure 45. 
(from Satyanarayanan et al., 2013, p. 44) 
In support of the highly mobile user, the well-connected tactical cloudlet/PaaS 
architecture is designed to leverage the integrated schema of the data cube (dimension 
tables/fact tables) within the HHQ data mart that perform interactive manipulation of data 
as seen in Figure 46.  
  
 Data Warehouse: A Multi-Tiered Architecture  Figure 46. 
(from Slideshare.net, 2008) 
The data cube is the method used by the data mart to accurately list stored data.  
The base cuboid has the sources of raw data and when queried provides 
raw data for the production of consumable analysis-based decision-
oriented information. Once complete, the finished information/data is 
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ready for consumption and is delivered to the requestor as a 
summarization in the apex cuboid. (Pujari, 2001, pp. 15–17 ) 
According to Reddy, Srinivasu, Rao, and Rikkula (2010, p. 2867), data in a data 
mart is described as: subject oriented; integrated; and time variant. 
A. COMPUTERIZED DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
The decision-maker requires access to the summary data views for analysis and 
raw data views to update the transactions; however, having summary views with the 
summaries of raw views and derived summary of summaries is not allowing the decision-
maker to update the transaction. With a need for the decision-maker to update the 
transactions, there should be raw views with transactional data. As such, all data marts 
(HHQ, adjacent, and subordinate) must support both summary and raw data views. This 
cycle that is comprised of the analysis of summary views followed by updating 
transactions depicts the decision-making loop that supports day-to-day operating 
activities. The computerized DSS goal is to keep the decision-maker connected to the 
aforementioned decision-making loop. As an edge user navigates across the screens 
displaying data views for all applications, computerized DSS provide SOP with 
transparent access to available resources at relevant tiers of command, evaluation of 
operational scenarios, and drilling down/rolling up to conduct analysis at appropriate 
cuboid. These navigation (drilling down and rolling up) capabilities allow for the 
movement “from higher level summary to lower level summary or detailed data” within 
the data views (Wang, 2008, p. 160).  
Drill-down capability provides the decision-maker with the ability to critically 
analyze data, such as splitting the metadata on a given dimension according to the 
hierarchy (e.g., temporal, spatial, and organizational hierarchies) on the corresponding 
dimensions across the dimensions in a query (Weippl, Mangisengi, Essmayr, 
Lichtenberger, & Winiwarter, 2001, pp. 1–5). Commanders have to consider the 
hierarchies when developing mission orders and coordinating CS/CSS for subordinate 









 Commander’s Spatial Drill Down Requirements  Figure 47. 
This requires the commander and subordinate decision-makers to have a well-
connected mobile device, whose access to the data marts at their level of command 
deliver the information necessary to perform auto-population within enabled warfighting 
application fields. In addition to the intuitive ability to navigate across the organizational 
hierarchy, the commander requires the ability from the mobile device to drill down 
relative to units of time and space. The commander’s dissemination of timelines to 
subordinate units must coincide with the commander’s assigned overall campaign 
timeline from HHQ. These seemingly disparate functions are running in parallel from the 
perspective of the commander; thus, requiring the commander’s ability to perform both 
drill down and rollup functions.  
Also, the assignment of mission-type orders to subordinates is expressed through 
the temporal, spatial, and organizational hierarchy as depicted in Figure 48.  
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 Hierarchical Dimensions Figure 48. 
As previously stated the commander must be cognizant of time; however, now 
has to consider geographical location. HHQ task to perform the full spectrum of warfare 
(stability operations to full-scale combat) within an assigned AOR requires the 
subordinate commander to deploy forces away from the FOB to non-FOB areas. Enabled 
by the robust data mart network architecture, the commander is able to receive 
synchronization updates from subordinates operating away from the FOB in order to 
deliver CS/CSS. The drill down access provides a SOP by which the commander is able 
to evaluate the multidimensional hierarchy cube in order to anticipate shortfalls, 
reallocate resources, and maximize operational efforts through coordination with 
HHQ/adjacent AOR commanders. This is possible due to the mobile device’s 
accessibility of Layer 1 (metadata layers) and Layer 2 (data views: raw and summary) 
located at the local tactical cloudlet. As shown in Figure 49, both pictures leverage the 
same color usage as an indicator of the same metadata present in both layers.  
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 Metadata layers and Data views (Raw and Summary) Figure 49. 
The shared data cube model acts as the organizational container with shared 
metadata for all warfighting applications. This will allow the performance of data 
exploitation supporting increased BFSA. The advanced analytics performed by the 
computerized DSS in the HHQ data mart create a single depiction of the truth that is 
needed in a complex decision-making environment (Power, 2008, pp 121–140). The 
decision-makers leverage the mobile device’s drill down capability within warfighting 
applications to go from a wider spatial area to a smaller spatial area with finer spatial 
resolution as shown in Figure 50. The decision-makers require the ability to navigate to 
another warfighting application’s spatial area, while maintaining the same drilled down 
spatial resolution.  
  
 Example Drill Down Within FMV Application Figure 50. 
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Power (2008) noted the below listed advantages of leveraging this technology: 
 Encouraged fact-based decisions 
 Improved decision quality 
 Improved efficiency and effectiveness of decision processes 
Due to the inherent biases associated with human cognitive decision-making 
based on information presentation and availability, decision-makers can be influenced 
both positively and negatively without the aid of computerized DSS (Power, 2008, 
pp 121–140). Individual fixation on initially received information influences 
interpretation of subsequent received information. Furthermore, recent information is 
prioritized higher and receives the most attention by decision-makers while historical 
information is often discounted or forgotten (Power, 2008, pp 121–140). The cube at your 
mobile device and organization requires an aging policy for summarization of raw data. 
Current data moves from near-time to past-time archived states. This requires constant 
summarization of data summaries previously performed as seen in Figure 51. 
  
 Data Summarization Over Time Figure 51. 
B. USER INTERFACES: OLAP VS TRANSACTIONAL 
As the flow of intelligently fused operational data matriculate from the enterprise 
level down to the tactical cloudlet for further synthesis using analytics from DWM, the 
locally stored data mart provides near-real time (subject to D-DIL conditions) 
synchronized data and metadata to the distributed data marts allowing for continual 
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updates to/from the edge user’s data views. The mission requirements necessitate 
overlapping network area coverage in order to ensure the overlap of SOPs among the 
decentralized units; to facilitate the conduct of distributed operations under the purview 
of AOR commanders who define commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). 
The users of different data marts have a need to share useful data and metadata across 
their organizational boundaries. The accurate and update-to-date characteristics (location, 
end-strength, etc.) of friendly, hostile, and civilian aid forces are essential to some 
warfighting applications, which require summarization of the topologies of the graph 
summary views for analysis. Nesamoney et al. (2000) warned the deployment of 
completely disjointed data marts would require the timely recreation of the mission 
critical metadata needed from another data mart. This duplication of effort coupled with 
the existing inability to effectively coordinate the usage of shared metadata would be 
resolved with the framework depicted in Figure 52. 
  
 Framework for Data Mart Architecture (from Reddy et al., 2010) Figure 52. 
As seen in Figure 52, the meta model level separates and categorizes data mart 
objects into their respective data marts (Reddy, 2010). Nesamoney et al. (2000) stated:  
The sharing of metadata becomes even more advantageous for global 
organizations with dispersed teams trying to solve similar or related data 
analysis problems using an integrated computing approach. In such 
organizations, coordination of efforts relies heavily on network computing 
and effective use of knowledge and resources developed by different 
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departments, groups, or teams. Indeed, the ability to share and reuse 
metadata within and across data marts deployed on intercommunity clouds 
becomes extremely important as the data marts on the cloud become more 
interdependent and various organizational units attempt to collaborate 
more closely and effectively.  
The metadata level process model can be viewed as the workflow model used 
within the DOD. Exercising the workflow model embeds the analytics in the process 
steps. The edge user well-connected to the local tactical cloudlet is able to query the 
stored analytics and download what they need to their mobile device. Once the edge users 
encounter a D-DIL environment, they are no longer able to access this critical capability. 
The disadvantaged user has the opportunity to create analytics on their mobile device that 
can be compared to what was previously stored until reconnection to the local tactical 
cloudlet occurs. 
These update driven high performance data marts store in advance information 
from integrated heterogeneous sources and perform on-line analytical processing (OLAP) 
in support of decision-making. When connected, the mobile device update and extract 
function receive time sensitive intelligence products (imagery and video) from HHQ via 
the tactical cloudlet that enable information dominance in a fluid environment. In 
addition to numeric (including METOC grids), the OLAP cube supports the 
summarization of pixels for imagery, video (including FMV), and radar. This would 
provide the edge user and other echelons within the AOR with a tactically acceptable 
good enough data management solution for the conduct of the exploitation preceding the 
action.  
The multidimensional graphic can be viewed as a slice of the cube that can be 
queried by multidimensional extensions (MDX) API. Since the MDX API is designed for 
querying multidimensional and hierarchically organized metadata, it is more flexible than 
the transactional (online transaction processing [OLTP]) user interface that is primarily 
used in conjunction with relational tables. Organized into convoluted schemas, OLTP 
systems is the vector for delivering original information to data marts, while OLAP 
systems aid in the analysis of the received information as seen in Figure 53. The goal of 
OLAP in the hands of the decision-maker at the tactical edge must be included in the 
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master data management (MDM) strategy thus making it imperative to store MDM 
transactions within this cube. The continual data summarization process graphically 
displayed in Figure 53 may not always be beneficial to the decision-maker’s DSS. There 
needs to exist an ability to identify metrics that would be used toward the isolation and 
retrieval of critical information from the aggregation process. This essential information 
may be of particular importance to the commander operating in the D-DIL environment. 
It needs to be readily available at the data mart in order to query transactions needed for 
the commanders at the last tactical edge mile.  
 
 OLAP vs. OLTP (from datawarehouse4u.info, 2010) Figure 53. 
A side-by-side comparison of OLTP and OLAP is outlined in Figure 54: 
 
 Comparison of OLTP and OLAP (from Monica, 2012)  Figure 54. 
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C. OPERATIONS FOR DISADVANTAGED USERS 
Edge users primarily operate in D-DIL environments that routinely experience the 
full spectrum of degraded networked connectivity. Although the last two operational 
environments are detrimental for highly mobile forces and is counteractive to their effort 
to gain and maintain a SOP, the disconnected environment isolates the edge user’s mobile 
device from the edge resource servicing local cloudlet (PaaS/DaaS); resulting in data 
model mis-synchronization. Unable to obtain up-to-date near real-time information, the 
mobile device is limited in its ability to enhance the D2D cycle for the warfighter due to 
the inability to access consolidated, up-to-date data located inside HHQ data mart. The 
loss of contact with the up-to-date data is clearly worse than not paying enough attention 
to the aging data. Until network connectivity is restored, the edge user is forced to 
perform analytics using the currently displayed snapshot that was previously obtained 
during the last network synchronization without the benefit of performing queries against 
HHQ data mart with the truth as they know it. 
Edge users whose dismounted operations extend beyond the distributed data mart 
network architecture operate in the unknown information space where information 
synchronization is no longer available. This is the result of the commander not having a 
previous requirement to explore this part of their AOR. In order to increase BFSA, the 
commander leverages overhead imagery assets either organically assigned or requested 
from HHQ/external sources (e.g., National Reconnaissance Office). The collected 
information is subsequently disseminated to the local tactical cloudlet where data 
aggregation and summarization is performed. Through the mobile device, the edge user is 
then able to query the local tactical cloudlet and receive the updated information needed 
to reacquire SOP. The speed in which this process is performed is dependent upon the D-
DIL conditions.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The purpose of this study was to analyze the requirements and feasibility of 
adapting a cloud model for enabling application deployment and data dissemination 
capability to Marine units in an expeditionary environment through a mobile device. The 
objectives of this examination were to critically evaluate current/future decision-making 
requirements of the edge users in a D-DIL environment; also, detailing the potential 
warfighter benefits of USMC procuring and adopting a tactical cloudlet solution that 
extends the enterprise end-to-end architecture to the company and below at the tactical 
edge. In order to do this, Chapter II’s research assessed current C2ISR capability gaps 
and current equipment shortfalls. Next, Chapter III continued the company and below 
evaluation of fielded PoR SoS and developed requirements for future innovation. Chapter 
IV outlined a design strategy and design specifications for the development of a 
prototype. Finally, Chapter V conducted a holistic analysis of DSS and its requirements 
needed to operate in a D-DIL environment. 
A. NEXTGEN SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Chapter II showed that capability gaps exist due to legacy systems being 
incapable of meeting the current C2ISR requirements at the company and below. The 
requirements in Appendix C and Table 6 helped shape and answered Research Question 
three in Chapter I.c of what future technology innovations and equipment requirements 
are necessary to operate a mobile device in a D-DIL environment.  
Table 6.   Capability Requirements for Future Mobility (from Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, 2013) 
Adaptive Extensible Interoperable Intuitive Modular Networked 
Performant Pluggable Reliable Shared  Trusted Universal 
 
These capabilities generated requirements for company and below edge units to 
have like capabilities as users operating at major subordinate commands. This guided the 
research toward a tactical cloudlet/PaaS cloud solution that incorporates the use of 
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COTS/GOTS NextGen mobile device technology and addressed Research Questions one 
and two in Chapter I.c.  
B. REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE ALTERNATIVES 
In Chapter III, an evaluation of the C2ISR requirements at the company and 
below was performed. Additionally, the current inventory of C2ISR equipment was 
examined to determine if they met the needs of the warfighter. As seen in Table 4, 
organic communication assets primarily consist of single channel and multichannel radio 
systems whose inadequate data throughput capabilities are insufficient in meeting the 
IER. Due to limitations of current equipment, edge units require access to C2ISR assets 
and personnel IOT leverage all available intelligently fused products that decrease the 
D2D cycle. Lack of access to PWM diminishes the value of the DWM. Bandwidth 
constricted C2 systems degrade the ability for the decision-maker to observe-orient-
decide-act within a dynamically changing fluid environment due to a degraded access to 
the DWM. Consequently, decision-maker’s CWM suffers resulting in slow and poor 
decision quality.  
Chapter III considered the expeditionary focus of the Marine Corps and 
developed requirements for a system capable of enhancing edge unit capabilities in a D-
DIL environment. The recommended tactical cloudlet/PaaS solution will enable increased 
flexibility and responsiveness due to accessibility of C2ISR resources via a mobile 
device, which addressed Research Question two in Chapter I.c. Platoon level patrols 
equipped with a mobile device with access to a well-connected tactical cloudlet would be 
able to view sensor applications in near real-time. In addition, Chapter III discussed 
technical interoperability and physical requirements for the mobile device.  
C. FUTURE HARDWARE DESIGN AND PROTOTYPE PLAN 
The focus of Chapter IV was the development of required design specifications 
needed to produce a notional DODIN compatible prototype using existing mature 
technologies. Chapter IV answered Research Question four in Chapter I.c by evaluating 
mobile device’s ability to navigate between critical C2ISR applications due to the 
intensive computational data processing performed on the backend at the tactical 
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cloudlet/PaaS platform. COTS/GOTS, such as Raytheon’s OFTCS architecture, provided 
a working proof of concept design whose utility would reduce the R&D timeline and 
serve as potential cost savings mechanism. The mobile device requirements outlined by 
Young and Ishii (2012) are applicable and served as a basis for the prototype design. Ease 
of use for the end-user remained a driver, along with scalability, redundancy, and 
security. The analysis determined that navigational capability between warfighting 
applications and sensors should be intuitive to the user. Minimal data entry should be 
required from the tactical users; data such as friendly location and call-sign should be 
auto-populated. Enemy locations should be obtained by overhead imagery which captures 
and transmit the data down to the mobile device within view and the tactical 
cloudlet/PaaS solution. In addition, a highly robust anti-jamming/anti-spoofing capability 
embedded in the mobile device is required for integration into the tactical cloudlet/PaaS 
solution. 
D. FUTURE SOFTWARE DESIGN AND PROTOTYPE PLAN 
In Chapter V, the researchers performed an in-depth analysis of the cloudlet 
computing architecture. The multi-dimensional data model was introduced which 
depicted how a decision-maker would query and retrieve actionable intelligence from the 
data mart using a mobile device. Another concept introduced was the computerized DSS, 
which is designed to aid the decision-making loop. The computerized DSS relies on the 
availability of the data marts in order to provide the decision-maker with SOP by 
performing drill drown/roll up functions within and across warfighting applications 
sharing those data marts. The existence of the warfighting applications sharing a data 
cube model allows for the computerized DSS to perform advanced analytics on 
information stored at the tactical cloudlet. Local cloudlet based capability is available to 
the decision-makers as long as they are in a well-connected environment; thus, the 
researchers examined the degraded capability of the decision-maker in the following two 
scenarios: 1) upon entry into a completely disconnected environment or 2) upon entry 
into an area not subjected to an intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). When 
isolated and unable to receive up-to-date information, the decision-maker is completely 
reliant on the robustness of the information locally stored on the mobile device. This 
 88
presents a unique set of circumstantial challenges. The decision-maker needs to 
determine whether he/she has to act based on available information or wait until 
connectivity is restored. Those choices must be carefully weighed depending on the 
operational situation. Depending upon D-DIL conditions, the latter scenario is the ideal 
fit for the tactical cloudlet solution. In this case the decision-maker, armed with the 
mobile device, would encounter time sensitive situations necessitating immediate actions 
and adjustments in response to the evolving threat. The computerized DSS would receive 
intelligently fused data streams based on continuous queries on the local cloudlet. The 
decision-maker would leverage live OLAP capability within the data mart. This would 
allow the decision-maker to issue orders across the temporal, spatial, and organizational 
hierarchies in a multi-dimensional information space. Chapter IV coupled with the 
aforementioned capability also addressed Research Question four in Chapter I.c.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is a lack of previous research in the application of commercial mobile 
devices in a tactical environment. During the course of this research, the researchers 
identified several key areas that were either beyond the scope of this research or should 
be analyzed in future research: 
 Development of Development Strategy 
 Willingness to pay and total ownership cost 
 Spectrum licensing costs 
 Accreditation process 
 Encryption policy and risk analysis 
 Personnel training requirements 
 Cloud model (Private vs. Hybrid vs. Public) 
The commercial sector continues to conduct research and development (R&D) in 
mobile device innovation. Factoring in size and weight and its effect on mobility, Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MCSC) has pursued the Handheld C2 project which 
incorporates COTS/GOTS mobile device technologies ISO mobile tactical units. MCSC 
should conduct analysis of alternatives comparing GOTS and COTS solutions leveraging 
research conducted by government academia including Naval Postgraduate School. 
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APPENDIX A. RIFLE COMPANY T/O 
Table of Organization Infantry Rifle Company (USMC Total Force Structure 
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APPENDIX B. RIFLE COMPANY T/E 
Table of Equipment Infantry Rifle Company (USMC Total Force Structure Management 






























APPENDIX C. MAGTF C2 CAPABILITY 
Top 5 Net-Enabled C2 Capability POM-14 Marine Corps Gap List from MAGTF C2 
Roadmap (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2013) 
Task ID Task Title MGL Tier 
MGL 
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APPENDIX D. PORTABLE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
Man Packable Communication Systems Description from COE for ICB-C2 (Combat 






The PRC-117F is the legacy multi-band manpack radio. This 
system is not expected to be used at the company level and below 
in the 2016 timeframe. However, PRC-117F will remain in use at 
the battalion level and above. The more recent PRC-117G 
provides Marines with a wideband, software-defined radio with 
the ability to transmit and receive high-bandwidth simultaneous 
voice and text data, graphics, and video over terrestrial and 
celestial networks. This radio interfaces with C2 end-user devices 
such as laptops and handhelds. The PRC-117G can be configured 
with appropriate antennae, such as those provided through its 
Field Expedient Mount, to provide SATCOM transmission. It can 
also be configured for man-pack, vehicular and base station 
applications suitable for operation in a multi-mode service 
environment. This radio will be used at the company level to 
maintain data and voice communications with the parent battalion 






The PRC-152A WB THHR serves as a lightweight data, voice, and 
video transmission solution using the ANW2 waveform. It delivers 
modern programmable encryption and is employed at all levels 
from the company commander down to the squad leader. Like the 
PRC-117G, the PRC-152A provides an interface to C2 end-user 
devices for data transmission. It also acts as a handheld voice 
communication system between the squad, platoon, company, and 
adjacent units. The legacy PRC-152 is expected to phase out. 
PRC-150 The PRC-150 is a leading HF technology that features Automatic 
Link Establishment (ALE) for secure voice and data transmission. 
Additionally, the PRC-150 leverages advanced frequency hopping, 
which ensures consistent, secure communications even in the 
presence of jamming. It provides long-haul communications at the 
platoon level and above. In the event that SATCOM capabilities are 
disabled or unavailable to platoons or companies during 
disaggregated and distributed operations, the PRC-150 system 
provides the only long-haul capability below the company level. 
PRC-153 
IISR 
The PRC-153 IISR is a type-3 encrypted, VHF line-of-sight (LOS) 
voice-only squad radio used to maintain communications within and 
between squads and fire teams. It is not a replacement or duplicate 
capability with the WB THHR, although it may be used to support 
voice communications with subordinate and parent units when 
environmental conditions permit. 
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JBC-P(H) The JBC-P(H) is a planned handheld C2 device with a 
standardized software baseline providing COP viewer and 
collaboration / chat capabilities down to the squad level. The JBC-
P(H) must be physically connected or tethered to a tactical data 
radio. At the squad level, this will primarily be the PRC-152A WB 
THHR, however it can also be used with the PRC-117G if 
required. 
ECO Kit Program Manager Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad (PM MERS) 
has fielded a large quantity of laptops with C2 and intelligence 
software. These ECO Kits provide an interim solution to C2 and 
intelligence needs at the company, platoon, and squad levels 
primarily as a manpack-able system, also re-usable within a fixed 
COC. Along with the ruggedized laptop computer with C2 and 
intelligence software, the kit comes equipped with a digital 
camera, and cabling to connect the laptop to tactical radios (PRC-
117F and PRC-117G). ECO is not expected to be a long-term 
solution. 
TLDHS The Target Location Designation and Hand-off System (TLDHS) 
is a modular, man-portable equipment suite used by the company 
fires support team (FiST), that provides the ability to quickly 
acquire targets in day, night, and near-all-weather visibility 
conditions via data and video transmission in near real time. It 
maintains interoperability with several systems including PRC-117 
systems and the JTCW Gateway to incorporate fires data into the 
COP. However, it requires a connection to the Advanced Field 
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). 
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APPENDIX E. VEHICULAR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
Vehicle Mounted Communication Systems Description from COE for ICB-C2 (Combat 
Development & Integration, 2012) 
System  Description 
VRC‐103 The VRC‐103 is a multi‐band radio system that provides a vehicular mounting 
and  power  amplification  option  for  the AN/PRC‐117F.  It  has  four  antenna 
parts which can be configured for SATCOM, VHF, and UHF transmission while 
providing embedded, type‐1 encryption. 
VRC‐104  The VRC‐104  is a vehicle‐mounted PRC‐150 HF  tactical  radio.  It serves as a 
long‐haul HF  system  that  is ALE compatible while providing voice and data 
capabilities while offering Type‐1 embedded NSA approved encryption. 
VRC‐112  The VRC‐112  is a kit  that amplifies and houses a  single PRC‐152A within a 
vehicle. The VRC‐114(V)1  (see below) and VRC‐112  radios  are often  in  the 
same  tactical  vehicle,  together  providing  simultaneous  voice  and  data 
transmission capabilities. 
VRC‐110  The VRC‐110 consists of  two VRC‐112 units  (i.e., dual PRC‐152A WB THHRs 
housed  in  vehicle  mounts  with  amplifiers).  This  system  also  provides  a 
significant data and voice capability while OTM. The VRC‐110 is being fielded 
in armament carrying HMMWVs and it comprises two VRC‐112s (see below). 










The  VRC‐111  and  VRC‐113  are  the  vehicle  amplifier  and  the  small‐form 
adapter, respectively, for the PRC‐148 MBITR. They provide a VHF capability 
with extended range for voice communications. The MBITR handheld itself is 
not  used  by  rifle  and  weapons  companies;  it  is  only  used  in  Maritime 
situations and  for  reconnaissance because of  its waterproofing capabilities. 





system  (SINCGARS) with  power  amplifier  and  two  radios  per  vehicle.  It  is 
used  as  a  network  extension  from  the  infantry  battalion  to  the  company. 
Due to  its current employment as a network extension and re‐transmission 





The  PoP  component  of  NOTM  is  a  vehicle‐mounted  set  of  equipment 
including a tactical data radio with OTM antenna, SATCOM OTM subsystem 
with  antenna  dish,  router  and  switch,  wireless  access  point,  and 
management  software with  user  interface.  It  supports OTM  C2  users,  but 
also allows dismounted Marines with C2 devices  tethered  to  the manpack 
PRC‐117G or PRC‐152A WB THHR to transmit and access data BLOS or OTH. 











The  JBC‐P  vehicle  variant  transmits  and  receives  individual warfighter  C2 
information and PLI data of  friendly  forces over  celestial networks.  It has 
integrated L‐band SATCOM capabilities and creates a network of C2 devices 
installed on platforms  to enable BFSA at  the company  level and below.  In 
the  future,  the  JBC‐P  vehicle  variant  will  be  replacing  both  the  Joint 
Capabilities  Release  (JCR), which  leverages  BFT2  technology,  and  current 
the  vehicle‐mounted  BFT  system.  Ultimately,  JBC‐P  will  allow  two‐way, 

























APPENDIX F. NON-MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
Stationary or Fixed Communication Systems Description from COE for ICB-C2 (Combat 
Development & Integration, 2012) 
 
System  Description 
MRC‐142C The  MRC‐142C  is  a  digital  wideband  terrestrial  transmission 
system  offering  voice  and  data  capability,  transported  on  a 
HMMVW but designed to be stationary while operational. It has 
a  more  limited  data  capability  than  the  celestial  VSAT  and 
terrestrial WPPL systems. 
VSAT  The VSAT  is  a  component  of  the  Support Wide Area Network 
(SWAN) FoS solutions that operates on a Ku band spectrum and 
provides BLOS  satellite communications at  fixed  locations. The 




secure  and  unsecure  voice.  Only  (1)  will  be  provided  by  the 















its Command Post  (CP)  variant, which will  replace  the BFT  TOC 
Kits  currently  being  used  throughout  the  Marine  Corps.  This 








ADS  systems  residing at  the battalion and above. This  software 
may  be  provided  through  the  Intelligence  Workstation  (IW), 
which will be employed by  the 0231  intelligence  analyst  at  the 







to  generate  a  variety  of  reports  and  products  using  text  and 
graphics. The software  load provides the applications to support 
different formats and data manipulation. 
































APPENDIX G. EMPLOYMENT METHODS 
Methods of Employment from COE for ICB-C2  
(Combat Development & Integration, 2012) 
 
Table 1: Form Factors Employed by Echelon and Condition 
 Manpack Vehicle Stationary 
Company COC 
Dismounted X   
Company COC OTM X X  
Company COC Fixed    
Jump* X X  
Forward / Vehicle-
based** X X  
Main X X X 
Platoon Dismounted X   
Platoon OTM X X  
Platoon Fixed (CP) X X  
Squad Dismounted X   
Squad OTM X X  
Squad Fixed X X  
* The systems employed for the COC OTM, Jump COC, and Forward / Vehicle-based 
COC may be similar or identical in some scenarios, but each COC configuration is 
unique.  
** The Forward / Vehicle-based COC represents the use of vehicular systems to 









THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 109
APPENDIX H. SYSTEMS TO CAPABILITY 
Systems to Capabilities Mapping from COE for ICB-C2 (Combat Development & 
Integration, 2012) 
 
- Tactical Network Access and Browsing: this requirement area relates to systems 
that enable end-user devices to connect to networks, as well as devices that have 
basic e-mail and web-browsing applications 
o SIPRNet Access 
o SIPRNet E-mail and Web Browsing 
o NIPRNet Access 
o NIPRNet E-mail and Web Browsing 
- Free Text Message / Data Transmission (Radio): this requirement area relates 
specifically to radio systems that are able to transmit in data mode, as well as 
provide a basic free text message and user interface 
- DISN Extension: this requirement area relates to systems that extend DISN 
services to several concurrent users 
- Voice Capabilities: this requirement area relates to systems that enable voice 
communications using a variety of specific media, including radios, SATCOM 
systems, etc. 
o Voice (Radio, Push-to-Talk) 
o Voice (Plain-Old-Telephone-System (POTS)) 
o Voice (SATCOM, Push-to-Talk) 
o Voice (VOSIP) 
- Applications: this requirement area relates to systems that can be mapped to core 
C2-related applications as well as general warfighting function applications; it is 
meant only to demonstrate the breadth of functions that any given system may 
provide at the company level and below 
o Chat Application 
o BFSA Application 
o COP/CTP Application 
o General Purpose Office Application (e.g., word processor, presentation, 
spreadsheet) 
o Fires Application and Overlay  
o Intelligence Application 
o Force Protection Application 
- Spectrums: this requirement area relates to systems that provide voice and/or 




o SATCOM (non-specific bands) 
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APPENDIX I. SYSTEMS TO CAPABILITY CONT 
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APPENDIX J. SYSTEM BASELINE AND ALLOCATION 
System Baseline and Allocation Structure from COE for ICB-C2 (Combat Development 
and Integration, 2012) 
 
 


































PRC‐152  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
PRC‐152A 
(ANW2)  2  2  4 
PRC‐148  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
JBC‐P (H)  1  2  4 
PRC‐117F  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
PRC‐117G  ‐  1  1 












































VRC‐110  ‐  ‐  1 
VRC‐112  ‐  ‐  1 
VRC‐114 (V)1  ‐  ‐  1 
VRC‐111/113  ‐  ‐  0/4 
MRC‐145  ‐  ‐  0/1 
NOTM PoP  ‐  ‐  0/1 



































































Kit  ‐  ‐  1 
ECCS RRK  ‐  ‐  0/1 
VSAT  ‐  ‐  0/1 
WPPL  ‐  ‐  0/1 
MRC‐142C  ‐  ‐  0/1 
TSM (RSAM, 
DEOS)  ‐  ‐  0/1 
DDS‐M  (LEM  or 
WSM)  ‐  ‐  1 















APPENDIX K. CLOUD SERVICE MODELS 
NIST Defined Service Models (from Mell & Grance, 2011, p. 2)  
 
 Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). End users access service provider 
applications that are hosted on a cloud infrastructure typically via a web 
browser interface. The end users do not manage the underlying cloud 
infrastructure or individual application capabilities; however, limited local 
application configuration management permissions can be granted to 
select users. 
 Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS). End users have the capability to host locally 
user-created or acquired applications on a cloud infrastructure so long as 
they were created using standards supported by the service provider. End 
users do not manage the underlying cloud infrastructure; however, they do 
have control over the hosted applications. 
 Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). End users devices use the cloud 
infrastructure to access and manage end user applications. End users do 
not manage the underlying cloud infrastructure; however, they do have 
control over the applications, operating systems, and storage provisioned.  
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APPENDIX L. USMC FUTURE VISION OF C2 
USMC MAGTF C2 Characteristics of Future Communication Systems (Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, 2013, p. 24) 
 
 Common: Command echelons use the same equipment. Unique MAGTF 
sensors and intelligence feeds enter via a standard gateway. 
 Modular: C2 systems are designed to enable component utilization that 
logically supports a variety of configurations for various C2 echelons. 
 Scalable: Software and hardware components are added and subtracted to 
facilitate C2 functions for all sizes of MAGTF operations centers. 
 Interoperable: C2 using SoS must possess the interoperability necessary to 
ensure success in joint and multinational operations as well as interactions 
with Other Government Agencies (OGAs) and Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGOs). 
 Trusted: C2 system users must have confidence in the capabilities of the 
network and the validity of the information made available by the 
network. 
 Shared: Sharing allows for the mutual use of the information services or 
capabilities between entities of the operational environment. This ability 
may cross functional or organizational boundaries. In addition, 
organizational entities need to adopt the shared meta-metadata model. 
Squads need the ability to communicate directly with the platoon and 
company but also have direct liaison authority to radio battalion in order to 
plan based off of all available collaborative shared and fused information. 
Also, this may require data flow from higher-to-lower security 
classifications in order to incorporate ISR into C2. Proper policies are 
critical to incentivize the data sharing between SoS. 
 Agile: To support expeditionary forces and operational concepts, the 
communications system must be agile. The key dimensions of C2 and 
communications system agility are: 
 Responsiveness: The ability to react to a change in the environment in a 
timely manner. 
 Flexibility: The ability to employ multiple methods to succeed and the 
capacity to move seamlessly between them. 
 Innovation: The ability to do new things and the ability to do old things in 
new ways. 
 Adaptation: Intelligent semi-automatic capability that can capture 
dynamically changing knowledge to be able to change work flows  
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 Reliability: Available when needed and perform as intended with low 
failure rates and few errors. 
 Customization of data views: The ability to adjust to suit the needs of the 
end user. Seamless ability to switch from one form (networked graph) to 
another (METOC gridded data) or picture in picture. Drill-down from an 
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